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The purpose of  this  study was to investigate the development 
of American policy  towards  the Barbary States in terras  of domestic 
political  opinion and partisan debate.    Previous studies have been pri- 
marily concerned with naval policy or diplomatic negotiation. 
The method followed was  to evaluate  the previous  scholarly 
literature and  the opinions of  the primary actors in the policy forma- 
tion process,   through their published writings.    The goal of this 
method was  to obtain a clear picture of the domestic political signifi- 
cance of the establishment  of a policy towards the Barbary States. 
It was  found that  the American policy began as a nonpartisan 
political problem that evolved during the debates  over the nature of 
the   Constitution and the establishment of a navy into a partisan issue. 
The  policy was   associated with the grand issues upon which  the political 
factions differentiated themselves.    A policy of inaction resulted when 
the Barbary  issue became submerged  under more pressing political prob- 
lems :     the policy was held  in stasis by equality of support and 
rejection by the political factions. 
An active policy was  initiated by Jefferson.     The particulars 
of his relationship to the Barbary  issue and   to both political factions 
allowed him to return the issue to  a nonpartisan status,  by Executive 
action. 
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INTRODUCTION 
American independence  from England created an entire new 
set of problems for the American revolutionaries.    As  colonies of 
England,  the Americans enjoyed privileges  of diplomatic representa- 
tion, protection of merchant shipping,  and  favorable trade relation- 
ships that ended with American  independence.    Moreover,   the independ- 
ence of America created  an entirely new context:    somehow,   the Americans 
had to create a viable  international existence for themselves,  allied 
neither with France nor England to such an extent  as  to jeopardize 
freedom, yet capable of  defending financial and  ideological interests 
abroad. 
The early history of the  Republic is  largely,  and rightly, 
concerned with  the establishment  of a stable relationship  for America 
between the two large powers.     But these more visible events tend to 
obscure  the long, difficult process whereby the United  States estab- 
lished an independent policy in  the Mediterranean.    The Barbary Pirates 
is  a term that  recalls  the marines  "on the shores of Tripoli" and 
shattering naval engagements to the casual student of American history 
but not the twenty-five-year struggle  to decide upon a policy and 
implement   it. 
The process whereby America established a policy in the Mediter- 
ranean is  characterized by the chronic perception that  America had 
insufficient resources to deal with the problem and domestic disagree- 
ment over the most suitable means   to establish a policy. 
The essence of the  problem was how to  regain a place  in the 
Mediterranean  trade  for American exporters  and shippers without  the 
protection of England against the depredations of the Barbary Pirates. 
The approaches  taken to the  problem fall into three segments:    obtain 
a new patron or pay  to join the  tributary system, payment and unsatis- 
factory membership  in the  tributary system,   and the beginning of  a 
vigorous  policy of force.     The body of  this paper falls into these 
divisions but  is particularly  concerned with the domestic political 
evolution of the Barbary issue.     While events  in Europe and on the North 
African coast had very significant impact on policy formation,  the 
decisions were made  in America and were influenced by the ongoing 
debate upon the great  issues of  the day. 
It  is to the great  credit of America that while simultaneously 
establishing a neutral role between England and France,   a distinctly 
unneutral policy was  established towards equals,  that  in the Mediter- 
ranean was  to lead to the downfall of the tributary system in which 
England and France were silent partners. 
PART  ONE 
THE  COMMISSIONERS 
Captain James Erving, master of the United States brig Betsy, 
passed by Gibralter in mid-October  1784 with a crew of  twenty-one and 
cargo for Teneriffe.     He  and his  crew were to have the unexpected 
distinction of becoming the first vessel of the American Confederation 
to be captured by the Barbary Corsairs.* 
The Barbary States  of Algiers, Morocco,  Tripoli and Tunis were 
situated along the north  coast of Africa,  across two thousand miles 
of treacherous shoals and  reefs, pounded by gales during the winter 
and spring months.       The history of  the area is one of an unbroken 
succession of wars reaching back to  the Punic Wars of  200 B.C.3 The 
Moorish  conquest which had  reached its furthest  point in 1492 with the 
capture of Granada,  left the Barbary powers under the spiritual leader- 
ship of the Sultan of Turkey.    The traditional enmity between Mohammedan 
and Christian was  to provide a basis for a foreign policy both profit- 
able and  long-lived  in Mediterranean waters. 
By the time of the American Revolution,  the Barbary powers 
enforced  a long-standing system of bribes  and tribute thinly disguised 
as treaty relationships.     All nations  that wished to engage in Mediter- 
ranean trade were  compelled  by threat of piracy to seek treaties from 
each Barbary nation. 
The larger nations,  France and England, had fairly stable 
relationships  and  long histories of regular payment of all  demands. 
The smaller nations,   like Portugal  and Naples,  faced the foreknowledge 
of piracy  and the uncertainty of receiving trade privileges even if 
the demands were met.    These unfortunate states were then compelled to 
raise their  tribute offer, forego Mediterranean trade, accept  the loss 
of  an indeterminate number of  their vessels  and citizens,   or go to war. 
Like  all international blackmail,   the demands were not bounded 
by reason or tradition but  conformed to the immediate needs of  the 
treasury or the capriciousness of the  reigning clique.    On at least 
one occasion,  the  ruling council of Algiers debated  as to which  nation 
should lose  its treaty so that  the treasury would be refilled.^    Near 
the end of   the eighteenth century the Consul of Denmark at Algiers 
reported that  the Dey had announced  that   in order to keep  the throne, 
he had to allow his  subjects to continue piracy.       At the most basic 
level,   this   system insured that if peace was made with one nation, 
war would be declared on another:    money would flow from bribes   and 
tribute simultaneously with money from the ransom of prisoners and the 
sale  of captured  ships and cargos. 
They were indeed dangerous men  that  Captain Erving and other 
American merchantmen began to  face: 
Their mode of attack is uniformly boarding.     For  this their 
vessels   are peculiarly constructed.     Their long lateen yards  drop 
on board   the enemy and afford a safe and easy conveyance  for the 
men who man them for this purpose; but being always crowded with 
men,  they throw them in from all points of the rigging and from 
all quarters of   the decks, having their sabres grasped between 
their teeth and their loaded pistols  in their belts, that they 
may have the  free use of their hands  in scaling  the gunnels  or 
netting of their enemy.     In this mode of attack,   they are very 
active and very desperate.   .   .   . ° 
The crew of  the Betsy was held by Morocco for six months and  then released. 
This was an obvious  hint that the time had come for the United States to 
join the tributary system on her own.     American vessels had previously 
been seized during the  early colonial period,7 but during most  of the 
eighteenth century American ships enjoyed the same privileges as English 
merchantmen in the Mediterranean,  privileges  purchased by annual tribute 
and the British fleet's  threatening ships of the line. 
This prerevolutionary Mediterranean trade was  considerable. 
Exact  import-export figures are  incomplete because of  the English predi- 
lection during the Revolution for burning American  custom houses.     This 
trade was estimated as 
.   .   .   about one Sixth of the Wheat  and Flour exported from the 
United States  and  about  one Fourth in value of  their dried and 
pickled Fish,  and some Rice,     Found  their best Markets in Mediter- 
ranean Ports:     that   these articles  constituted the principal part 
of what we sent into  that Sea:     that  the commerce loaded outward 
from Eighty  to one hundred ships  annually,  of Twenty Thousand Tons, 
navigated by about  Twelve Hundred Seamen.8 
Soon after the American Revolution began, England revoked  the 
passports  that   identified American merchant  ships  as under English 
protection in the Mediterranean.       This  trade was  abandoned during the 
war,  "...   and after the Peace which ensued,   it was obvious  to  [Ameri- 
can]   Merchants   that their Adventures  into that  Sea would be exposed to 
the Depredations  of the piratical States on the Coast  of the Barbary."10 
This trade,  if it   could be regained, was  thought to be ".   .   .   as 
profitable to   [America]   as  any part of our european  trade."1      By 1784, 
American vessels were beginning to enter the Mediterranean again,  some 
with forged or purchased  passes, some flying the British colors to pass 
as Englishmen,   and a few  in convoy with Spanish or Portuguese warships. 
American policymakers were faced with a distinct set  of choices: 
1.     Cease all trade  in the Mediterranean 
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2. Seek a new sponsor to fill the role England played until 1776 
3. Join the Barbary tributary system by treaty,  paying annual tribute 
and frequent  "gifts" 
4. Declare, and fight,  a war. 
The resolution  of the Barbary question was  finally to extend 
over  the  first  formative thirty years of the American Republic.    The 
question was to  figure  prominently in the philosophical and political 
disputes that  led  to the making of the Constitution, the formation  of 
formal political  parties,  and the  founding of  the Navy.     Every foreign 
policy executive during the period had to contend directly with the 
problem itself or with   its ramifications  in American relations with the 
other nations concerned. 
Thomas Jefferson and John Adams represent the most central actors 
in the  formation of American policy towards the Barbary pirates.    The 
stereotypes  of history picture Jefferson as being both a pacifist and 
an opponent of the establishment  of an American Navy,  and they show 
13 John Adams  as  favoring  those  things Jefferson opposed.   "     These images 
do neither man justice  and inhibit  a complete understanding of the 
subterranean political debate and maneuver that characterized the 
various stages of  decision-making. 
It  is  reasonably  easy to understand how these stereotypes evolved 
and easier still to see how the slender thread of the Barbary problem 
has become lost in  the internecine struggles of the period.     The quasi- 
war with France,  the British interference with American shipping, the 
problems of neutrality,  domestic political turmoil,  and the Napoleonic 
wars—all serve to obscure the fact   that the American policy of  1801  to 
1806 which led  to the end  of the Barbary tribute system did not spring 
to life full grown, but evolved with America's growth as an  independent 
nation. 
The   careers and opinions of Jefferson and Adams offer a close 
parallel to  the evolutionary growth of  the Barbary policy.     They were 
to  serve the nation first as Commissioners in Europe,  Adams  assigned to 
London and Jefferson to Paris.    Their   collective  additional  duty was 
to direct negotiations   concerning the  Barbary Powers. 
On May 7,   1784,   Congress commissioned them,  along with  the 
venerable Dr.   Franklin   (who was to resign within the month),   to enter 
into negotiations with  the Barbary Powers  to secure "...   treaties of 
amity and commerce   .   .   . M1      This direct approach to the problem resulted 
from the earlier failure of France to  fulfill her  obligation under 
Article VIII  of the Treaty of  1778,  in which France had agreed   to employ 
"good offices and  interposition with,"  the Barbary States "in order to 
provide as  fully and efficaciously as possible for the benefit,   conven- 
ience and safety of  the  said United States."" 
Jefferson and Adams directed negotiations  from their posts in 
Europe by instructing various   agents on  the North African coast by letter 
until late 1789, when both returned to the United States after the rati- 
fication of  the Constitution.     Both found the supervision of  their Barbary 
agents  difficult:     tradition and protocol had not been yet established 
for missions  abroad  such  as their own,  so that frequent requests  for 
instruction had to be addressed to John Jay, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
and to the Congress.     Their own instructions from America frequently 
took as  long as four months in transit,   followed by several more months 
to instruct and receive  a reply from the  African agents.     Adding  to this 
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the return trip of their letters to America,  and any debate upon their 
recommendations by the Congress,  it becomes easy to understand,  in light 
of this  six to ten month cycle, how events outpaced direction. 
America wanted the Mediterranean market  for her exports,   as 
indicated by the Congressional commissioners, but Adams and Jefferson 
disagreed about the proper mode by which to regain it.     "Shall we 
have peace or war," Adams  asked Jefferson,  going on to elaborate the 
problems that  faced  their mission: 
(1) We may at this time have a peace with them,  in spight   [sic]   of 
all the Intrigues of the English  and others  to prevent  it, for a 
Sum of Money. 
(2) We never shall have Peace,   though France, Spain,  England and 
Holland should use all their Influence in our favor without a Sum 
of Money. 
(3) That Neither the Benevolence of France nor the Malevolence of 
England will ever be able to Materially Diminish or Increase  the Sum. 
(4) The longer the Negotiation is delayed, the larger will be the 
demand. From these Premises I conclude it to be wisest for us to 
negotiate and pay the necessary Sum, without  loss  of time  ...   16 
Adams, later in the same letter, summarized his position: "At 
present we are Sacrificing a Million annually to Save one Gift of two 
Hundred Thousand Pounds.    This is not  good Economy."1 
Suspicions  that the influence of England  and France was devoted 
to  the maintenance of  their special interests in the Mediterranean were 
shared by Adams,  Jefferson,  Jay,  and others.     In 1783, Benjamin Franklin 
wrote to the then Minister of Foreign Affairs,  Robert Livingston,   "I 
have heard in London that it is a maxim among the Merchants,  that  if 
there were no Algiers,   it would be worth England's while to build 
one."18    Louis XIV of  France is said to have  remarked earlier, "If  there 
ill 9 were no Algiers,  I would make one. 
There can be no question that England and France had special 
interests within the tributary system.     The Barbary nation's own import- 
export  trade was  carried on neutral vessels,  of which it was reported 
that the French had ".   .   .   4/5 of the  commerce   ..." and were  ".   .   .   the 
chief  carriers of its produce."20    Britain's interest is   clear:    American 
shipping represented more serious competition in the world's markets, 
and if  the Barbary States  closed off the Mediterranean  to American 
vessels, English merchants would prosper.    There appears   to have been 
no shortage of ill feelings   across the Atlantic,   as represented by the 
defeat  in Parliament of  a free trade bill in 1783.   ^    American feelings 
toward England are well illustrated by the polarization of  the political 
wings  of the American revolutionaries,   and their  clashing  opinions on 
England's relationship  to, and effects upon, American independence. 
The tensions between these two senior participants  in the Barbary 
system may not be  discounted,   however.     These tensions followed from 
the adversary positions  they took on commercial, military  and,  increas- 
ingly,  political affairs.    Because of  this rivalry and American domestic 
perceptions of the  two participants,  it became difficult  to describe  the 
motives behind various maneuvers France and England made.     If either 
influenced American chances in the Mediterranean indirectly by tactics 
directed  at the other,  at  least one political faction in America would 
ascribe damming motivations. 
Jefferson's  reply  to Adams'  letter set out the position he was 
to retain towards Barbary policy throughout the duration of the question: 
of the four positions laid  down in your letter of the 3rd instant, 
I agree to the first  three   ...  As to the 4th,   ..   .   this will 
depend upon the  immediate   captures.     [The Maria of Boston and the 
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Dauphin of Philadelphia, with crew of twenty-one, were captured 
by Algiers in late October,  1786,   indicating impatience with the 
slowness of America to enter the system.]     However,  if It is 
decided that we shall buy a peace,   I know no reason for delaying 
the  operation,  but should rather think it ought to be hastened. 
But   I should prefer the obtaining of it by war.     (1)  Justice is 
in favor of this opinion.     (2)  Honor favors it.     (3)   It will procure 
us  respect In Europe,  and respect  is a safeguard to interest.     (4)   It 
will arm the Federal head with the  safest  of all insterments of 
coercion over their delinquent members and prevent  them using what 
is  less safe.     I think so far you go with me.     But in the next two 
steps we shall differ.     (5)  I think it less expensive  (6)   equally 
effectual.     I ask a fleet of  150 guns, one half of which shall be 
in constant   cruise.     This fleet built, manned  and victualled for six 
months will cost 1x450,000 sterling   .   .   .   But so  far I have gone with 
the supposition  that the whole weight of the war will rest on us. 
But   (1) Naples will join us  (2)  every principle  of reason  tells us 
Portugal will join us.22 
The capture of  the Maria and the Dauphin had occurred because 
Spain had completed  an expensive treaty with Algiers in August  1785, 
ending a brief conflict important only because the Algerines had been 
blocked out  of the Atlantic.     With the peace,  they were quickly through 
Gibralter and into the  intra-European coastwise shipping lanes. 
The twenty-one American captives   created a special and  continuing 
problem for the Commissioners,   for they were not specifically empowered 
by  Congress   to pay ransoms.23    They dispatched  agent  Charles Lamb to 
Algiers on  their own authority to negotiate the release of the twenty- 
one captives at up to $200.00 each.24    Lamb quickly discovered that 
$200.00 each was  inadequate:     the Dey of Algiers wanted $59,496.00 for 
ransom without a    treaty.25    Jefferson and Adams,   in frustration,  referred 
the specific question of redemption to the Congress,  for their total 
budget  for all four treaties was only $80,000.00. 
The question of American citizens  thrown into slavery by Moors 
created considerable emotion In America but it did not  result in the 
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quick release of the captives.     The problem created by the  captives  for 
the Commissioners  in Europe had two tactical  facets to be  resolved. 
Jefferson had sought during the winter of 1784-85  to determine 
what prices the European nations had paid historically for treaties and 
redemptions.     "This they will not  tell us," Jefferson wrote to James 
Madison,  "yet from some glimmerings it  appears  to be very  considerable."27 
Money usually obtained  the captives'   release,  but the practice of holding 
captives until a treaty was reached could not have been unknown on the 
Barbary.     Redemption was such an important item that "there was main- 
tained an   'Order of  the Holy Trinity and Redemption of Captives' with 
headquarters in Paris and agents throughout the Barbary,"  an order known 
as  the Malthurians,  from the  Church of St.  Malthurin. Jefferson sought 
their aid in obtaining the prisoners'   release, but the effort was not 
to be successful.2' 
The second  approach Adams and Jefferson took was  to determine 
the possibility that the Porte of Turkey,  to whom the Barbary States 
stood  in theoretical vassalage,    could moderate  the demands  for treaties 
and redemptions.     To this end, Jefferson consulted French Foreign Minis- 
ter Vergennes, who had served  in Constantinople.     Vergennes  replied that 
such an approach would "not procure   [America]   a peace at Algiers one 
penny the cheaper." and that  "money was the sole  agent at Algiers, 
except so far as fear could be  induced also." 
Without the  funds or the authorization to  raise them in Europe, 
the  Commissioners chose to display an attitude of  disinterest  towards 
the plight of the prisoners  in hopes of moderating the Algerine demands. 
"This was to prepare  their captors for the ransoming of them at a 
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reasonable price."     Jefferson wrote to Jay,   "...   their own intrest 
requires that  I should leave them to think thus hardly of me."31    This 
final pose of disinterestedness  remained the Commissioners'   public 
face throughout their term of service. 
Their efforts had some success.     A satisfactory treaty was 
negotiated by Thomas Barclay with Morocco on June 28,   1786.     This treaty, 
which called  for no annual tribute but  a one-time payment of  $10,000, 
was to remain in effect throughout the period, with but  one exception. 
Congress   ratified the treaty on July 18, 1787. 
Portugal, during the winter of 1786-1787,  stepped into the breach 
that the  Spanish settlement  [with Algiers]   created by declaring war on 
Algiers.     The Portuguese  chose  to prosecute their conflict by a constant 
blockade of the Algerines at Gibralter,   a blockade that was to last 
until 1794.     The loss  of only two American vessels between Spain's 
peace with the pirates  and 1794 is directly due to Portugal for, as 
Jefferson noted, the Algerines had to search the entire Mediterranean 
for their neighbors'  vessels but   could pounce on Americans at  the 
entrance.33    This phenomena may be  interpreted in several ways.    As 
the cause  for fear of more  immediate captures was  removed,  the plight 
of the twenty-one captives at Algiers became less pressing and efforts 
for their release less  compelling.     Another view could be that this 
"breather" period allowed American trade with Europe to grow and, with 
it, the pressures for American participation in the Mediterranean. 
But  still the basic question was whether to fight or pay as  a 
matter of long-running policy.    Adams and Jefferson, as sincere and 
energetic as  their efforts were,   could not alone establish either:    this 
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was  the prerogative of  the Congress.     But as Adams perceptively noted 
on July 31,   1786 
I perceive that neither force nor money will be  applied.     Our 
states  are so backward that  they will do nothing for some years.   .   . 
A disposition seems  rather  to prevail among our  citizens to give up 
all ideas of navigation and naval power,   and lay themselves  conse- 
quently at the mercy of foreigners   .   .   .34 
On at  least one level the argument that Adams presented was 
academic:     the  lack of disposition to pay or fight may be traced to the 
poor  financial status of the Confederation,  or the perception of the 
Congress of  the  financial problems  of the nation.    Adams and Jefferson 
computed estimates of  the  cost  of their respective opinions to treat  or 
fight,35 to  little avail,   for the Congress was not willing  to  fully  fund 
either.     In relation to the American captures,   this   is particularly 
curious.     In light  of John Adams'   ability to borrow one million florins 
in Holland without  the commission of Congress  to issue bonds,3"  it is 
difficult to understand why  the Congress would not allocate the necessary 
$56,000 to release the captives  of Algiers. 
Adams went to the  center of  the difficulties   faced by the Conti- 
nental  government  in a letter to Jefferson on June 6,   1786,  and  it is  as 
informative  for emotion as  content 
We  are fundamentally wrong.     [in our argument as  to means of meeting 
the piratical threat]     The first thing to be done  is for Congress  to 
have a Revenue.     Taxes   [and]   Duties must be laid on by Congress on 
the Assemblies and appropriated to the Payment of  Interest.     The 
moment this  is done we may borrow a Sum adequate  to meet all our 
necessities.     If it is not done in my opinion you and I as well as 
every other Servent   [sic]  of the United States in Europe ought  to 
go home,  give up  all points,   and  let our exports and imports be done 
in European bottoms.    My indignation is raised beyond all reasonable 
patience to see the People of  all  the United  States in a torpor,  and 
see them a prey  to every Robber, Pirate, and cheat  in Europe.J/ 
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Adams'   statement  centers  on the frustration felt by many Americans 
at  the lack of a compelling ability or authority for the federal govern- 
ment.     John Jay, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in a report to the 
Congress on  a request by the Commissioners   for additional funds  to treat 
with Tripoli and Algiers,  said "...  your  Secretary doubts the policy 
of it."38    Jay said,  going on to elaborate his pessimism: 
.   .   .   the  Federal Government,  in its present state,  is rather 
paternal  and persuasive than coercive  and efficient.     Congress   can 
make no certain dependence on the States  for any specific sums   to 
be required and paid  in any given period   .   .   .39 
Jay had previously made his preference  for war clear in his recommenda- 
tions of 1785  to start a navy and arm merchant ships against pirates.40 
Not many months later, he modified his  ideas:     "If_ our government could 
draw forth the Resources  of the Country, which notwithstanding all 
appearances  to the contrary, are  abundant,   I should prefer War to 
Tribute  .   .   . n41 
These various opinions, and their progression,  raise in regard 
to Jay's motivation some questions that become somewhat  clearer in  light 
of his  response to a proposal by the Virginia delegates  to the Congress 
on July 27th to 30th,  1787  to create a confederacy of nations to fight 
the Barbary States. 
Close comparison of the Virginia proposal, brought  forth by 
William Grayson  (later to gain the reputation as a rabid anti-navy man) 
with an earlier draft by Jefferson, results   in the inescapable conclusion 
that Jefferson slipped a copy of his proposal  to Grayson.42    A reasonable 
supposition,   although unproven, would be that Jefferson's   friend and 
Virginia political associate James Monroe provided the conduit.43 
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A probable basis for this indirect approach to the  Congress was 
the disagreement between the Commissioners over the most effective 
means  of regaining a Mediterranean trade.    As Jefferson's administrative 
superior, Jay also seemed to be backing away from advocacy of  force and 
as Jefferson's  commission did not include the powers  to establish mili- 
tary relationships with other nations, prudence  seemed to be in order. 
The proposal  itself  called for the Minister to France alone "to 
form a Confederacy with the Powers of Europe who are now at war with the 
piratical states   ...  or may be disposed to go to war with them."44 
It further specified methods of quotas, command,  cruising stations, and 
mutual guarantees  against aggression.     A motion was proposed and passed 
to refer the matter  to the Secretary  for Foreign Affairs. 
Jay replied within the week,   recalling his preference of "War 
to Tribute" but  refraining from comment  on the proposal's merits or 
economies,  counseled  for ".   .   . Congress to delay entering into the 
proposed,  or indeed any other Engagements,  until the Means of executing 
them appear to be clearly within their Reach." 
This argument,  resting upon the distressed finances of the 
Confederation,   caused  the rejection of the plan by the Congress.46 
Jefferson,   late in his  life,   accepted it as valid,  and, generally, 
historians have embraced the  idea. 
Clearly,   if the United  States  lacked the ability to "draw forth 
the Resources of the Country," as Jay claimed in 1786 and again in 1788, 
then the United States   lacked  the ability in 1785, when Jay advocated 
the foundation of a navy.    Jefferson had previously responded to just 
such an argument  in a  letter to Monroe:     "There will never be any 
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" 
money in the  treasury   'till the Confederacy shews   [sic]   it's  teeth. "^ 
If coercive  abilities were lacking  in the Confederation,  then also 
lacking was   the will to utilize the means available. 
Jay seemed to believe that  the plight  of  the prisoners and the 
mounting insult and hostility of Europe would draw the nation towards 
a more powerful federal state.**    On the occasion of the Algierian 
declaration of war in 1785, Jay noted  that the war would ".   .   .   tend to 
draw us more   closely  into a federal system."50    Before  the federal con- 
vention was  in session,  Jay declared   that they would "...   require the 
Aid of Calamity to render  their Dictates effectual."51 
George Washington's beliefs were much like Jay's but perhaps 
more militant.     "In such an enlightened, in such a liberal age," Washing- 
ton asked,   is  it possible  that "the Great Maritime powers of Europe 
should submit   to pay an annual tribute  to the little piratical states 
of Barbary?"52    He thought  it "the highest disgrace on them to become 
tributary to such banditti, who might  for half the sum that is paid 
to  them be exterminated from the Earth."53    Yet when the Marquis de 
Lafayette  laid  the plan for confederacy against the pirates before him 
Washington responded  that  it was "vain  to talk about chastising the 
Algerians,   .   .   . ' til the wisdom and force of the Union can be more 
concentrated and better applied."5 
An attempt to estimate the exact degree of influence such politi- 
cally motivated  opinions had on Barbary policy would be a highly subjec- 
tive matter,  but well within the bounds  of reason is the supposition 
that Barbary policy was becoming politicized.     General beliefs that 
were beginning to coalesce  into specific political programs carried 
issues before them.     During the process  the power "to provide and 
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maintain a navy" became politically connected to North African policy. 
Arguments for and against ratification of the Constitution well illus- 
trate this  issue. 
Reviewing the debate of the Constitutional Convention reveals 
little discussion of naval power outside the general war power.55 
Supporters  of  the Constitution, who came  to be called  the Federalists, 
maintained that  if the Constitution were ratified a navy would be one of 
the good results.     The opposition  to this conception of government, 
known interchangeably  as anti-Federalists or Republicans, held either 
that a navy was  a bad thing or that, if desirable,  one could be provided 
by  the Confederation. 
These  two positions, generally,  took on a sectional character 
that did not perfectly mirror support for a navy.    The particular economic 
conditions of the states  in regard to debt and trade tended to define 
their attitudes  towards naval aspirations. 
South Carolina and Georgia possessed the  less than 2% of America's 
white families  that sold one fifth of America's exports  and purchased 
one fifth of the imports.     In direct exchange with the world,  only the 
ports of Charleston and Savannah showed a favorable trade balance.56 
It comes as no surprise that vigorous support  for a navy came from that 
area. 57 
The tobacco growing area between North Carolina and Maryland 
showed a different attitude.    While   tobacco accounted for one third  of 
American exports,58 it did not enter  into the Mediterranean trade at 
all.59    The prewa*-   debt of the region to England, wiped out by the 
legislatures, was again a threat as   a result of the possibility that 
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Federal courts would  allow suits by foreign creditors.    This area 
provided voracious support  for the anti-Federalist naval position.     At 
the Virginia Ratifying Convention in June  of 1788,  the same William 
Grayson who had introduced  the Confederacy of Nations naval proposal 
in 1787,  ridiculed the need  for a navy by citing the Algerines as the 
chief foe to "fill the Chesapeake with mighty fleets   .   .   . "60 
Actually,   although Grayson ridiculed the idea,  it was not  so far- 
fetched.     On May 9,   1788 the Moroccan foreign secretary, still waiting 
for the  $10,000 the treaty with America called for,  sent a note  to the 
consuls at Tangiers,  saying that while Morocco was not presently at 
war with any nation,  if war did occur: 
His imperial majesty will also send his frigates  to America,  provided 
with European pilots,  and if they make  any prizes,  they shall be 
dealt with as  above mentioned   [burned with cargos,  crews enslaved], 
as his majesty stands  in no want of Worldly effects; and he  trusts 
God will make him a conqueror. 61 
This   same theme was played by Madison in the  Federalist Papers, 
a collection generally  regarded as nearly  an "official" compilation of 
Federalist views during this tangled period.     "The   [naval]  batteries 
most capable   of  repelling foreign enterprises on our safety," Madison 
said in No.   41, "are happily such as   can never be turned by a perfidious 
government  against  our liberties," a sentiment identical to that  of 
Jefferson in his letter of July 11,  1786 to Adams. 
Madison goes on to observe that 
no part   of the Union ought to feel more anxiety   .   .   .  than New York. 
...  The  Great emporium of   [America's]   commerce,   the great  reservoir 
of   its wealth,  lies  every moment at the mercy of events,  and may be 
regarded  as a hostage for ignominious  compliances with the dictates 
of a foreign enemy or even with the rapacious demands of pirates 
and barbarians. 62 
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This appeal went  to the  citizens of the wheat belt that stretched 
from northern Maryland  to the Hudson Valley, who exported wheat  and 
flour,  and to New England, whose economy developed by adversity to 
concentrate  in the  carrying trades. 
But even within these sectional preferences, diversity flourished. 
Republican Melancthon Smith published a pamphlet   in New York State meeting 
the Federalist argument  that a Constitution was necessary to begin a navy. 
The Confederation could either fight or make a treaty,   Smith said, it 
only  required   money,   and  he,   for  one,  would be willing  to  allow  reaSOn- 
able powers to raise it. At the Massachusetts Convention,  an old 
soldier encouraged his  Republican comrades to oppose Federalist designs, 
and spoke to the naval invasion argument,  saying "...   they can not 
starve us out;   they can not bring their ships upon the land.   ..." 
This sectional,  partisan approach to a navy was recognized by 
arch-Federalist Alexander Hamilton, writing as "Publius" in The Federalist, 
No.   11.     "There are  appearances to authorize a supposition that  the 
adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of 
America," Hamilton began,   "has already excited uneasy sensations  in several 
of the Maritime powers in Europe."    Thus establishing a reason to have a 
navy, Hamilton went  on to make his sectional pitch: 
It happens,  indeed,   that different portions of Confederated America 
possess each some peculiar advantage for this essential   [naval] 
establishment   ...   the difference in duration of the ships which 
the navy might be composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, 
would be of signal importance, either in the view of naval strength 
or of national economy.   .   .   .   Some of  the Southern and of  the Middle 
states would yield a great plenty of  iron.   .   .   .   Seamen must be 
chiefly drawn from the Northern hive 65 
Later in the series,  Hamilton made his position as  clear as possible: 
"If we mean to be  a commercial people,  or even to be secure on our Atlantic 
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side, we must  endeavor,  as  soon as possible,  to have a Navy.    To this 
purpose  there must be dockyards and arsenals  .   .   .""° 
When the  Constitution was ratified in 1789, navalists were 
rewarded with several provisions.     Congress had the power "to provide 
and maintain a navy," to regulate such a force, and to have  exclusive 
legislative powers over dock yards.     The President was made  commander- 
in-chief  of the navy.     The states were forbidden to own ships of war 
during time of peace.°7    These powers did nothing to help  the diplomatic 
efforts of Adams  and Jefferson.    The combination of a lack of funds,  the 
inability  to compel an agreement by  force, and the ever inflating demands 
of the piratical states   frustrated efforts at diplomacy.    The twenty-one 
prisoners  at Algiers had been reduced to eleven by disease and overwork 
by 1788, when the Commissioners returned to America.68    The Mediterranean 
trade had not been regained  and the convolutions in Europe over the 
French Revolution made a trade restoration appear even more unlikely. 
American  trade with Spain and Portugal was safe only as long as Portugal 
remained  at war with Algiers. 
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PART TWO 
THE NAVY 
The selection of George Washington as the United States'   first 
President was as closely foreordained  as  an electoral process may allow. 
The General's immense prestige made the election practically a consensus. 
John Adams, elected Vice President, would chair the Senate.     Col.  Alexander 
Hamilton,  Washington's wartime aide de camp, was selected  to head the 
Treasury Department, Henry Knox was appointed Secretary of War, and Edmund 
Randolph was appointed Attorney General.    Thomas Jefferson, sincerely 
desiring retirement  at Monticello,"^ finally succumbed to the blandish- 
ments of Washington and became  the Secretary of  State  ".   .   .   it is not 
for an individual to chuse  [sic]  his past."    He wrote to Washington on 
December 15,  1789,  "You are to marshall us as best may be for the public 
good."70 
Washington was rightly pleased with this galaxy of talent.   "I  feel 
myself supported by able coadjutors." he noted,  going on to add prematurely 
that  the cabinet members "harmonize extremely well together." 
As  the new government established  itself,   the rhetoric of the 
constitutional debate concerning the dangers of Barbary policy receded 
before other pressing issues.     Washington's message to the Congress of 
December 8,   1790,  indicated the reduced importance of Mediterranean trade 
by the award of thirty lines to Indian affairs as  compared to six for 
the Mediterranean problems.72    But that paragraph did ask Congress to 
deliberate  on the question 73 
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Thomas Jefferson held the immediate responsibility for Barbary 
affairs, which remained static throughout the first year of the admin- 
istration.     The first matter of official business Jefferson discussed 
with  the President was the situation of "the unfortunate Christians in 
captivity among the Barbarians." Unfortunately,  the human proclivity 
to take advantage of  others had also led to a widespread confidence game; 
the  families of missing sailors were being bilked by swindlers who 
reported  the seamen captured by the pirates,  and represented themselves 
as agents   collecting the "ransom."'5 
Private schemes  for the redemption of  the prisoners had multiplied 
until they  threatened the continuing official efforts.     Jefferson 
discouraged  such attempts as best he could, explaining, "...   the more 
all voluntary interpositions are discouraged,  the better for our unhappy 
friends."76 
Jefferson's passive role did not extend to the domestic sector: 
Washington's December 8th,  1790, Message to Congress presented another 
Opportunity  to present his  opinion to the nation and the Congress.     James 
Madison, on December 11th delivered a request by the House to the Secre- 
tary of State to report   on the Mediterranean problem.     Jefferson  replied 
on December  28th with a package of documents:     "A Proposal to Use  Force 
against  the Barbary States,  A Report on American Trade  in the Mediterranean, 
A Report on American Captives in Algiers" and several documentary enclo- 
sures. 
"The Proposal to Use Force   .   .   .   ," the major statement of the 
package,  represents Jefferson's plan for a naval confederacy against the 
Barbary powers.     Senator William Maclay,  in one of the few congressional 
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comments on  the proposal, noted, quite  correctly,  In his Journal that 
Jefferson's message "...   seemed to breathe resentment and abounded 
with martial estimates in a naval way."'8 
The Federalists, during the debate on the Constitution, had 
pleaded the presumed impotence of the Confederation to create or fund 
a navy as a reason  to ratify  the new government; now they were  confronted 
with Jefferson's recommendation to use  force.    The positions  that  the 
Hamiltonians had taken on the Algerine piracy issue,  theretofore identi- 
cal to Jefferson's  ideas, were to be promptly forgotten when  the powers 
of the new government  came  to be wielded. 
On  February 1st,  1791,   the Senate resolved that  the President 
should proceed to take measures  to ransom the captives  in Algiers.    On 
February 22nd,  Washington informed the Senate that, the Emperor of 
Morocco having died,  a new treaty would be necessary.     The Senate resolved 
that the prisoners should be redeemed, at a cost not  to exceed $40,000. 
But  the House,   in heavy debate March 1st through 3rd, declined 
to fund ransoming or navy building, instead  appropriating $20,000 for 
the renewal of  the Moroccan treaty.    Any other projects would have to 
wait until "the  situation of the Treasury shall more clearly authorize 
appropriations  for this purpose."80 
This decision has been attributed to the members'   revulsion at 
the staggering appropriations made during the session, which was besieged 
by "a cloud of   claimants."81    That declaration treats  the problems of 
tax and tariff  that were to underlie the future financial system of the 
country overly lightly but it may be inferred  that the members continued 
to think the nation's  finances precarious.    Without vigorous follow-up 
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support by the President,  Jefferson's leadership in advocating  force 
again failed.     When the option was  to arise again events, not men, would 
provide the spur to action. 
The conflict between Britain and France in Europe carried over 
to North American affairs,   threatening war with England,  then war with 
France.     The issues  formed  around respect for American neutrality and 
neutral wartime  rights. 
On April 20,  1792,   France declared war on Austria and Prussia, 
opening the War of  the First  Coalition for a five-year run.     France, 
assuming that America would honor the treaty of 1778,  sent Citizen Genet 
to the United States to cement the alliance. 
At the bottom of the Hamiltonian financial system of planned 
reduction of  debt was the  federal revenue, based largely upon import 
duties.     By habit  or preference, American imports came mostly from 
England,  although France went  so far as to put American goods on the 
same footing as those of her own citizens in February 1793. Super- 
imposed upon the conflict between England and France were the political 
and emotional identifications of the factions that were to form politi- 
cal parties. 
The Federalists felt  that  to support France would be to go to 
war with England,   and thereby destroy the Federal government by ending 
its source of revenue.    Jefferson and the Republicans saw the First 
Coalition as the means by which democratic republicanism would be 
crushed in France,   then in America, by the forces of autocracy. 
Fisher Ames,  an arch-Hamiltonian Federalist  from Massachusetts, 
provides an unknowing commentary over the emotionalism of the issues. 
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France has  stopped more than a hundred sail of our vessels  at 
Bordeaux.     We sit  still; we  say nothing; we effect to depend 
on their justice; we make excuses.    England stops our vessels 
with a provoking insolence;  we are in a rage.     This marked 
discrimination is not merited by the French.     They may rob us; 
they may,   as  it is probable  they will, cut off Tom Paine's 
head,  vote out  the Trinity,   kill their priests, rob the mer- 
chants and burn their Bibles; we stand ready to approve all 
they do,   and to approve more  than they can do.     This French 
mania is  the bain of our politics, the moral poison that makes 
our peace so sickly.°3 
One need  only consult  the Republican press of B.   F.  Bache's General 
Advertiser  (later Aurora)  or Phillip Freneau's   (National Gazette, et al.) 
for the period to get  an equally damning indictment of England. 
British spoliation of American neutral commerce and British insis- 
tence on non-reciprocal agreements regarding trade enraged public opinion. 
But British diplomacy created another threat to British-American relations. 
England, perhaps  in order to gain  another ally against France,  arranged 
a truce between Portugal and Algiers, ending the blockade at Gibralter. 
The effect was  immediate. 
Edward  Church, American Consul at Lisbon, Portugal wrote the 
Secretary of State on October 12,   1793 that 
The conduct of  the British in this business  leaves no room to doubt 
or mistake  their object, which was evidently aimed at us,  and proves 
that  their envy,  jealousy,  and hatred will never be appeased,  and 
that they will leave nothing unattempted  to effect our ruin.     As 
further confirmation,  it is worthy of remark,  that the same British 
agent   [Charles Logie, consul at Algiers]   obtained a truce at the 
same time between the states of Holland and the Dey, for six months, 
whereby we  and  the Hanse towns  are now left the only prey to those 
barbarians.^ 
Although Consul Church sent  a circular warning to American citizens 
in all the ports  of Portugal on October 13th,  1793,85  the pirates  took a 
dozen American ships and in excess   of one hundred more American captives 
during October and November 86 
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Jefferson finally gave  in to his urge for retirement,   formally 
resigning on December 31,  1793.    As Jefferson wrote to his successor, 
Edmund Randolph,  at  the  State  Department,   "No circumstance   .   .   . will 
87 ever tempt me to engage  in anything public  ..."        While this state- 
ment became  less  than true in  1796, Jefferson's resignation left James 
Madison as  titular leader of the Republicans in the government. 
Madison met the further piratical depredations head on by asso- 
ciating them directly with other grievances against Britain. The best 
way to meet  the pirates'   threat, Madison felt, was to retaliate against 
the nation that had unleashed  the pirates 88 Temporarily, at  least, 
the ongoing American diplomatic attempt to reach a settlement with 
Algiers ended, when  the Dey of Algiers, presumably overcome by joy at 
the financial prospects  of more  easy captures, refused  to negotiate 
further.89    Madison's "Commercial Propositions" were  intended  to 
subject England  to the  same trade regulations that England imposed on 
neutral American shipping  in the continental trade,  and to act  as a 
punitive measure to discourage perceived English support of the pirates. 
The Federalist forces, cut off from diplomatic settlement possi- 
bilities with Algiers  and reluctant of  the expense, proposed a naval 
bill that separated  the policies  towards Barbary and England;  policies 
that had been connected by the  "Commercial Propositions."    The Federalists 
seemed to operate on what may be  called the "Theory of Certain Loss": 
America was  certain to lose money in case of further political attack,90 
and was  certain to  lose still further if the large trade with England was 
interrupted but naval expenditures were not  a certain loss. 
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A synopsis of the House debate on this measure has been pre- 
served in the Annals of  Congress.     The Senate, meeting in secret 
session,  left   few records.    The bill's vocal supporters  in the House 
were largely Federalists   and Northerners, while the opposition was 
Republican,  three  (Madison, Nicholas, Giles)   out of four  (John Smilie 
of Pennsylvania)   from Virginia.    Both sides realized that while the 
procuring of  the proposed  ships was directed  towards Algiers,  the 
passage  of the bill might  lead to the permanent establishment of a navy. 
This may help  explain the partial reversal of positions   in debate:     the 
Republicans appealing to Federalist  fence-sitters by citing the national 
debt,  for example, or Federalist Benjamin Goodhoe of Massachusetts 
observing that   "He had no  doubt  that  the Algerines were let loose  [by 
England]   on American commerce to prevent supplies going to France   . 
William Giles   [Republican: Virginia]  spoke to the "Certain Loss 
Theory"  at the height of debate: 
[a]   .   .   .   objection to  the measure consists of the certainty and 
enormity of   the expense, with a total uncertainty of its efficacy; 
whereas the  plan of purchasing a peace regards economy, if its 
efficacy should be doubted.     In this case,  if the object be not 
effected,   the money will not be expended.9 
Giles went on to appeal to Federalist  and Republican theory.    He viewed 
The establishment  of  a navy as a complete dereliction of the policy 
of discharging the principal of the public debt.    History does not 
afford an  instance of  a nation which continued to increase their 
navy and decreased  their debt at the same  time.   ...     A navy is  tne 
most expensive of all means of defense, and the tyranny of government 
consists  in   the expensiveness of their machinery. 
William Smith.[Federalist,   South  Carolina]  then rose to counter Giles' 
arguments 
If it were the design of the House to incur a vast «£!"•*»** 
establishment  of a navy, merely for idle purposes of vain parade 
there would be force in some of the objections.   ...  The question 
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was simply whether our commerce  required protection against  the 
Algerine corsairs,  and whether  this was the best mode of protection. 
.   .   .   [Giles] would consider the proposed substitutes  for a naval 
armament .   .   .   (1)   to purchase peace of the Algerines   (2)   to depend 
on Portugal breaking her truce with Algiers   (3)   to pass  commercial 
regulations   against Great Britain  (4)   to subsidize other nations 
to protect our commerce.    To these several substitutions,   [Smith] 
might,   in a   few words,   object  that the first was  impractical,  the 
second, precarious,  the third inoperative and the fourth, dishonor- 
able.94 
Mr.  Giles  replied  to Mr.   Smith 
.   .   .  The gentleman calls upon our humanity to ameliorate the condi- 
tions of the   captives,  by a declaration of war against  a barbarian 
...   or perhaps the gentleman conceives that,  after the frigates 
have performed wonders  upon the water,  they would  leave the element, 
boldly march  upon the land, and break the chains of the prisoners.95 
The Naval Act of  179496 carried,  50 yeas  to 39 nays, with a 
Republican-inspired proviso that naval construction must cease if peace 
with Algiers was  attained.     The Naval Act passed not by a Federalist 
majority over a Republican minority, nor by a Northern-Southern split but 
by an urban-coastal coalition over the representatives of rural,  inland 
areas.97    Simply stated,  those congressmen who represented areas with 
maritime interests  supported the measure,  those whose  inland constituents 
had little or no  concern with the economics of trade voted against  the bill. 
The Naval Act of  1794 authorized  construction of four ships of 
44 guns  and  two ships of  36  guns and the hiring of 2,060 sailors  to man 
them.     Construction went  forward at six separate sites, dispersed to share 
the benefits of the construction fairly.98    The modesty of this enterprise 
is realized when it  is recalled that the Royal British Navy possessed 
about  115 ships of   the line,   France  76,   Spain 56,  and Holland,   49.     The 
United States was  constructing a navy slightly larger  than that of the 
Kingdom of Naples   (4)   and  at parity with that of Portugal. 
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George Washington,   under Congressional direction, continued to 
attempt to  reach settlements with Algiers, Tunis,  and Tripoli.    He 
appealed to Congress  on March 2,  1795 to fund positions for three 
separate consuls on the North African coast,   "[for]   the more  successful 
conduct of our affairs on the coast of Barbary." 100 This the Congress 
approved.     The results of  this act were rapid.    Peace with Algiers was 
obtained  in September  1795 by diplomatic means.    The cost would amount 
to about $763,000 plus $10,000 a year as a "present" and $20,000 upon 
the appointment of a new consul.101    The Congress approved the treaty 
on February 29,  1796, with provision for payment by the issue  of $800,000 
in 6 percent Bank of the United States bonds.    These bonds were sold by 
Baring Company of London for sterling.    As of January 4,   1797,   $240,000 
remained unsold;   the general European war having soaked up specie to 
the general detriment of all bond issues.102    While the American prisoners 
were finally released in June  of 1796,  the slow sale of bonds  and accom- 
panying slowness  of payment were to create future problems.    European 
states were already outraged because this lavish overpayment threatened 
to upset established methods  of dealing with the Barbary States.103 
Treaties were concluded with Tripoli (1796)  and Tunis   (1797) 
through the interposition, by  threat,  of Algiers.    The costs were, respec- 
tively,   $56,486 and  $107,000.     The Senate ratified the treaty with 
Tripoli on June  10,   1797  and  the treaty with Tunis on March 6,   1798.- 
The most  immediate effects of the treaty with Algiers were the 
stoppage of naval construction and an increase in Mediterranean trade. 
Washington, on March 15,   1796,   recalled to both houses of Congress that 
"if a peace    shall take place between the United States and Algiers," 
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section nine  of the Naval Act of 1794 required "that no further 
proceedings be had under   [the] Act."105    Actual construction on three 
of the vessels  continued because contracts were already in force, 
but when they were  to expire with  the ships still uncompleted, they 
would not be renewed. 
American trade in the Mediterranean multiplied fivefold between 
1797 and 1799.     The American Consul  at Gibralter,  James Simpson, reported 
that twelve or fourteen American merchant ships were to enter the Mediter- 
ranean  in May,   1797. 106 Eighty U.S.   vessels were to enter  the Mediterranean 
during the spring of  1799.107 
Between  1797  and 1801,   the Barbary Coast remained quiet,  at a cost 
of some  $926,000.     Domestic political conflict settled into other areas 
as  the relationships between the United States,  Britain,  and France 
evolved.     George Washington refused  to serve a third term as President, 
which brought Thomas Jefferson out of retirement to stand as  the Repub- 
lican candidate.    The Federalist  forces split:    Hamilton, because of 
the notorious Reynolds affair, could not run himself, so his supporters 
engaged in a scheme  to throw the election to the Federalist Vice Presi- 
dential candidate, Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina.108    John Adams, 
the nominal Federalist Presidential candidate, supported by the moderate 
wing of his faction, won the election by a narrow three vote margin over 
Thomas Jefferson, who became Vice President. 
The Adams administration "was born to trouble,"109 much of which 
was not of his making.     John Jay had gone to England in 1794  to negotiate 
a variety  of diplomatic matters,  the most important of which were British 
impressment of American sailors and treatment of American neutral rights. 
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Jay's agreement eased the  tense relationship between England and 
the United States  in particular cases, but Jay's failure to obtain 
general recognition of American neutral rights caused the ideologi- 
cally anti-English Republicans  to believe that  the Federalists had 
purposely given those rights to England in exchange for a special 
relationship.     Jay was hanged  in effigy by some of the more enter- 
prising Republicans,   and his treaty passed the Senate by the barest 
two-thirds majority,   twenty to ten,  in 1795.    Protests against  the 
treaty were too late  to affect  the Senate vote, but certainly damaged 
the Adams  candidacy in 1796. 
Jay's treaty enraged the French, who felt it violated the Franco- 
American  treaty of 1778 and specifically damaged their interests.    The 
French Minister to America, Adet,  campaigned openly for the election 
of Jefferson in 1796.     When the British withdrew from the West Indies 
to meet pressing naval needs elsewhere,  the French promptly filled 
the void.     The French,  on March 2, 1797,  issued  a decree which 
authorized the seizure of neutral vessels laden in whole or in part 
with enemy property. 
Secretary of State Pickering reported  in June that 316 American 
vessels had been  taken by the French since July, 1796. As  the 
undeclared  "Quasi War" with France broke out  in the West Indies, the 
Federalists moved  into the position of favoring war. 
Where were  the frigates now?    Three were to be completed during 
1797:    Washington's  "Farewell Address" of December  7, 1796 had flatly 
stated from experience that 
The most sincere Neutrality is not a sufficient guard •t****** 
depredations  of nations  at war.    To secure respect to a neutral 
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flag,   requires a naval force, organized and ready to vindicate 
it,   from insult  or aggression.U* 
William Smith  of South Carolina,  Chairman of the House Ways 
and Means  Committee,   persuaded the House to appropriate the money 
necessary to complete  the United States   (44) ,  the Constitution   (44) 
and the  Constellation   (36)   during the winter of 1796-97.113 
Feelings between Federalists and Republicans over the French 
actions ran high,  it  is fair to  say.    The breach that Jay's Treaty 
had caused  in the  Congress had not healed, and the Federalists were 
now possessed by war  fever.     "When we  [the Senate]  get upon  [the 
subject of]  Vessels of War for the protection of our commerce," Vice 
President  Jefferson wrote to Madison, "I fear  they  [the Federalists] 
will give   [have]   their way."114 
Jefferson was not  indifferent to the "atrocious depredations 
.   .   .   committed on our  commerce" by the French but did not feel that 
war was the best  redress  for America's grievances. 
By  a series  of acts during the years of  1797 to 1799 the Congress, 
under Federalist  leadership, brought the strength of the navy up to 
thirty vessels, exclusive of revenue cutters  and galleys, by completing 
the vessels   of the Naval Act of 1794, constructing new frigates,  and 
purchasing other,  smaller vessels.116   The great popular reaction to 
the "XYZ affair" of 1798 ended the Republican ability to block or 
amend the  later legislation.     The new American Navy requited itself 
well in single ship  combat with the French in the West Indies. 
President Adams'   Address to  the Congress of November 22nd,   1800 
contained the recommendation for "reasonable and systematic arrangements" 
for the navy, with the unstated admission that   the naval war with France 
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of the past  several years was winding down.    The Congress seized the 
idea in the  interest of economy and produced the Naval Peace Establish- 
ment Act  of  1801. 
The testimony of  Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert on 
January 12,  1801 had called for reduction of  the fleet to thirteen frig- 
ates, the rest to be sold for reasons of insufficient size or quality 
for purposes  of a permanent national defense.   •*•      After the ratification 
of a new treaty with France,  these recommendations were passed by sub- 
stantial majorities  in both houses.    The signature of President Adams 
made the Act law on March 3,   1801,  the day before he left office.118 
Conditions on the North African coast were becoming again unset- 
tled during this winter  of  1800-1801.    Harassment of the growing American 
trade,  though short of the rough treatment of 1793,   caused the American 
consuls on the  coast to advocate a more vigorous policy.    James  Cathcart 
at Algiers expressed a conviction that war alone would make the United 
States respected in Algiers.119    When Consul William Eaton at Tunis 
expressed a similar  conviction to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, 
Pickering replied that the Adams  administration thought it unwise to 
employ naval vessels  in the Mediterranean until a peace with France 
was on a firm foundation.     In that event, Pickering wrote to Eaton in 
January,   1800,   the United  States would send a naval squadron "sufficient 
to destroy the corsairs  of  any one, or of all of the regencies together."™ 
Later that year,  the last Secretary of State of the Adams admin- 
istration,  John Marshall,   turned down a proposal by Denmark and Sweden 
to join an armed confederacy against the corsairs.     In a letter to John 
Q. Adams,  Marshall cited the obligations imposed by the existent 
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treaties, however burdensome,   and the hazard of  stationing naval 
units in the Mediterranean while hostilities with France continued 
as his principal reasons  for the decision.121 
Another reason could be the earlier formation by Sweden and 
Denmark of  the League of Armed Neutrality to extract trade concessions 
from both belligerents in the general war.     Concern for ongoing 
negotiations with France could have precluded participation in such a 
confederacy for  fear  that association with such a league would weaken 
the American bargaining position as an independent neutral desiring 
only equal  rights. 
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PART THREE 
VIGOROUS  POLICY  IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
The election of   1800 surpassed even the election of 1796 for 
depth of subterranean political plotting.     John Adams,   in a letter to 
his youngest son, Thomas,   summed up his feelings about  the election: 
"My little bark has been oversett   [sic]   in a squall of  thunder and 
ill f) lightening and hail attended with a strong smell of sulphur  .   .   . 
Jefferson,   in a letter to Madison,   thought that such an election 
was appropriate  to an era characterized by "maniac proceedings." 
Once  again,  Alexander Hamilton had directed his  followers  to 
support Pinckney over Adams.    The Federalists had already demonstrated 
their lack of touch with the people by the passage of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts,  in a heat of nationalistic fervor.    Adams  continued 
negotiations with France were unpopular, as were the dismissals of 
Pickering and McHenry  from the cabinet.124    The Republican candidates, 
Jefferson for President  and Aaron Burr for Vice President, were both 
popular with the people  and  in possession of  the most potent party 
electoral organizations yet seen in America. 
Hamilton, with unparalleled indiscretion, prepared a personal 
attack on Adams to be distributed to leading Federalists.     It fell into 
hostile hands  and was  rushed into print by Burr and his New York 
associates.     Hamilton's description of Adams as  "...  a man of imagina- 
tion sublimated and excentric; propitious neither to the regular display 
of sound judgement nor to steady perseverance   . 
the Federalist party and  injured the Adams candidacy. 
"125 further divided 
45 
A number of disgruntled Federalists,  fearing Jefferson, 
threw their electoral votes to Burr when it became clear that the 
Federalist  candidates were going to lose.     The result was a tie 
between Jefferson and Burr,   throwing the election into the lame duck, 
Federalist dominated House of Representatives. 
There exists  a lack of consensus among historians over Hamilton's 
role in influencing the outcome of this election:    Nathan Schachner 
feels that Hamilton wanted a "deal" with Jefferson on defense measures, 
Ralph Brown believes that Hamilton actively opposed throwing the election 
to Burr,  and Adrienne Koch states that Jefferson "repudiated with vigor 
every suggestion of a political deal." 
It is easy to understand how,   in the midst of these tangled 
theories of the election of  1800,   the Naval Peace Establishment Act of 
1801 might be  overlooked.     It  is unfair then, as Jefferson's critics 
have charged,   to blame Jefferson alone for selling off the navy, where 
17 7 
there was clear Congressional direction to do so. 
When Thomas Jefferson became President  in March 1801, he received 
word that Tripoli had repudiated  the treaty of 1796 and demanded $250,000 
for a new settlement.     Tunis followed suit in May, having signalized its 
intent by chopping down the flag pole at the American Consulate.     Consul 
Cathcart later described the conversation he held with the son of the 
ruling bashaw upon the occasion.     "It is  a difficult thing to get a flag 
staff put up  once it  comes down," said the Bashaw's son.     "When the 
American flag comes down,   it will take a great deal of green [money]   to 
get it up again."128 
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Jefferson,   following the practice of both Washington and Adams, 
placed written questions before his cabinet.     On May 15,  1801, he posed 
two questions for   immediate discussion and later written responses: 
"Shall the  squadron now at Norfolk be ordered  to cruise  in the Mediter- 
ranean?" and "What   shall be the object of that  cruise?"!2^ 
Jefferson's   cabinet was divided over the specific object of such 
a venture but united in support of  the policy.    Levi Lincoln, Attorney 
General,  felt that   U.S.   vessels should only defend shipping against 
attack.    Albert Gallatin,  Secretary of the Treasury, did not quibble: 
"To declare war and make war are synonomous.     The executive can not put 
us in a state of war, but  if we put into that state either by decree 
of congress or of  the other nation,   the command and direction of the 
public force then belongs  to the executive." 
Secretary of  the Navy Robert  Smith felt that "If a nation 
commences war,  the executive is bound to apply the public  force to 
defend the nation."     Secretary of War Henry Dearborne believed that 
the expedition should ".   .   .   go forth openly to protect our commerce .   .   . 
Secretary of State James Madison thought  that "the cruise   ... be under- 
taken and the object   openly declared to every nation." 
A four-ship squadron under the command of Commodore Richard 
Dale set sail  for the Mediterranean  from Norfolk on June 1,   1801.    The 
reduction of  the naval establishment went  forward simultaneously.    It 
had been Jefferson's   contention since  1784 that only a small  fleet 
would be necessary to   subdue the pirates, which let him go forward 
with the reduction of   the  fleet  for the financial savings which he and 
Albert Gallatin thought would result.     By laying up seven frigates in 
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what modern parlance would call "mothballs," leaving only six on 
active duty,   the expenses  of the fleet would be reduced to about 
$500,000 annually.131    Jefferson wrote his nephew, Thomas Randolph, 
that while Congress required that six frigates remain armed that 
".   .   .  three of them would have been quite enough.ul3Z 
This naval  reduction program was just a part of Jefferson's 
conception of  a limited  federal government.    Dumas Malone describes 
that program of government economy,  reduction of taxes, and payment 
of the national debt as based not merely on the expectation that peace 
1  o^ 
could be maintained, but was "inseparable from his concept.   .   .   ." 
Naval expenditures  fell to $915,000 in 1802, benefiting from the sale 
of naval vessels,  about  one half the level of funding the Federalists 
passed for 1801.134    Naval expenditures never again fell so low, for 
peace, that essential  factor for the forwarding of Jefferson's conception, 
eluded him in the Mediterranean.     The Dale squadron's arrival in the 
Mediterranean  coincided with further hostile acts by Tripoli and Tunis 
towards American vessels,   and conflict ensued. 
Jefferson was exceedingly careful in his first message to Congress 
of December 8,   1801,  to remark that,  under the Constitution, actions 
beyond those that he had taken for the defense of American vessels would 
require the consent  of the  Congress.    Alexander Hamilton, writing in 
the New York Evening Post   as  "Lucius Crassus," was furious over Jefferson's 
disavowal of executive prerogative.     "The enigma is now solved, and we 
are presented with one of  the most singular paradoxes ever advanced by 
,.      " £t amounts to 
a man claiming to be a statesman,"    Hamilton wroce,     .   • 
nothing less  than  this,  that between two nations there may exist a state 
of mplete war on one side—of peace on the other! 
.•135 
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But  the chief obstacle would be the Congress.    In response to 
Jefferson's message,  the  Congress,  after extensive debate,  passed 
the Act for the Protection of American Seamen and Commerce of February 6, 
1802, which specifically set out the defensive character of the naval 
force in the Mediterraneanf3oNot until 1804 did the Congress make pro- 
vision for the  conduct  of  the war.    The USS Philadelphia (44) , commanded 
by Captain William Bainbridge,  engaged in the blockade of Tripoli, ran 
aground, with the  capture of three hundred American seamen.    Public 
opinion was shocked  in Spring,   1804;  Congress authorized more vessels 
and established a special "Mediterranean" fund to prosecute the war.137 
This fund was raised by a two and one half percent advalorem duty. 
Of the actual movement  of ships and strategy of battle, little 
need be said,  for a number of excellent accounts exist. Still, as 
in 1784,  the cycle of dispatch and reply of orders to the Mediterranean 
took about six months,  rendering tactical control to the naval commanders 
on duty in the Mediterranean.     Four squadrons were sent successively to 
the Mediterranean,  each slightly larger than the one before.    The Dale 
squadron served   from June 1801 until Spring of 1802, when relieved by 
Commodore Richard Morris  and his squadron.    Morris was relieved by 
another squadron commanded by Captain Edward Preble during the summer 
of 1803.     Finally, during  the summer of  1804, Preble was relieved by 
Commodore Samuel Barron, with the largest fleet yet. 
The com-anders'   services are difficult to evaluate.    The activities 
of these four squadrons were quite in keeping with the naval philosophy 
of the day.    These ships escorted merchant vessels, sought out  the 
privateers  for battle,  and blockaded the ports of the warring nations. 
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Although the American Navy quickly built up a reputation in the 
Mediterranean  for bravery and initiative,  the treaties concluded with 
Tunis and Tripoli,  in 1807  and 1805,   respectively, still cost the 
United States  $70,000.139    The asset  of the presence of a fleet, it 
seems, was not well utilized by American civilian negotiators. 
Treaties  that were signed were not observed:    Algiers, Tripoli 
and Tunis would again break their treaties in 1810, 1812 and 1815.    But 
by late 1807,  the Napoleonic wars of Europe created an exceedingly poor 
climate for armed neutrals  of any kind, and the American vessels were 
withdrawn.    The  final chapter would not be complete until after the 
War of 1812, when two American squadrons returned to the Mediterranean 
and obtained treaties with Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis by the kind of 
diplomacy the pirates understood:     destruction of ports and the capture 
or sinking of hostile vessels.    The Barbary Coast sank thereafter into 
richly deserved  obscurity. 
But  the United States had not  simply chosen from among the 
available options  this most effective method and applied it.    A 
tremendous distance  separates  the  Continental Congress, sending a 
Commission, hat  in hand,   to seek European protection for the infant 
American trade  from the activities of  Dale, Morris, Preble and Barron. 
A far shorter span separates  the later gentlemen from the final gasp 
of Barbary piracy.     When England and France refused to protect American 
trade, more pressure was  applied to America to actually be independent, 
and to seek a solution to the Barbary problem that uniquely suited 
American resources  and character. 
Throughout  the period of 1785  to 1807, sincere American **"* 
were made  continually to reach diplomatic agreements with the Ba, 
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their yield was poor  in the  face of cost and national dishonor, but 
the growth of American trade to the Mediterranean was to provide the 
ralson d'etre for the despatch of the Dale squadron in Summer,  1801. 
The payment  to Algiers of   annual tribute was a grave error in judgement 
by Congress, made across partisan lines over the issue of economy.    When 
the sum of  $1,000,000, paid  to Algiers, Tripoli and Tunis, is compared 
to the average  cost  of   $305,420 for each of the first three frigates 
completed1^0  in 1797,   the "efficacy" of such arrangements appears dimin- 
ished. 
No single individual  invested more  ink and paper in the idea of a 
naval confederacy than Thomas Jefferson.    He brought the idea up in 1784-5 
with Adams,  Jay, Lafayette  and others:    he arranged,  it appears,  for the 
introduction of the Virginia Resolution in 1787:    and he presented the 
plan on a third occasion as  Secretary of State in 1791. 
When the option again presented itself to Adams' Secretary of 
State, John Marshall,  the time was still wrong, but  for different reasons. 
The previous  failures   could be attributed  to the financial state of the 
Union, or to perceptions  about  that state.    The fourth occasion failed 
because it  threatened to interfere with more important negotiations. 
Adams was not  indisposed  towards using force on the pirates, simply the 
lawful treaties and  the  strategic situation with France would not permit 
it.    His administration provided the naval tool that  the Republicans 
probably would not have provided. 
If one engages  in a certain style of speculative thought, the 
connection between Barbary policy and political development becomes some- 
what clearer.     The Confederation followed a basically apolitical policy, 
the "factions" as yet  invisible.     During the ratification of the Constitution, 
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certain  aspects of  the relationship with the Barbary States were 
associated with large issues like defense,  economy and peace.    After 
the new government was established,   questions concerning the Barbary 
remained  connected   to the  ideological arguments of the Constitutional 
debate,   and became politicized in  congressional actions.    Jefferson, 
by making the  relationships with the  Barbary States a matter of Executive 
discretion,  took the  issue out of partisan politics.    Although the war 
was not  popular, Jefferson's actions were sufficiently modest to appeal 
to moderates of both  factions to pass   continuing appropriations for the 
navy. 
The perspective of  familiar American history shows only a small 
Barbary Coast  in the background, with a huge England and France in the 
foreground.     Other small nations were not newly independent ex-colonial 
possessions, but  they did face similar problems with the  two "super 
powers" of  the time, who were less than respectful, on occasion of rights 
unmatched by power.     In this way, policy towards France  and England 
always contained elements of dependence, for it was difficult,  if not 
impossible,   to compel     them to agree.     In direct opposition to this 
dependence, was  the evolutionary course of American policy towards the 
Barbary:     if  the  figure of Barbary should not,  indeed, be somewhat 
larger in relationship to England and France,  it should be moved closer 
to  the foreground, out  of  the mists. 
Jefferson best   characterized this policy in a letter to Adams  in 
1813, when distasteful events were far enough in the past  to resume their 
broken friendship,   "If  I have differed with you on this ground it was not 
on principle, but  on time.   ... But I respect too much the weighty 
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opinions  of others  to be unyielding on this point, and acquiesce with 
a prayer   'quod felix faustumoue sit'   ..."  [may this be favorable 
T   1*1 and auspicious   .   .   .J. 
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Brown,   John Adams,  p.   204 cites Lyman Butterfield,   (ed.) 
The Papers  of John Adams:    Microfilm Edition (Boston:    Massachusetts 
Historical  Society,   1954-1959),  reel  399. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTES  ON THE  BARBARY POWERS 
Accounts of American relations with the Barbary powers fall 
into two general groups:     those whose emphasis falls on the particu- 
lars of actual diplomatic negotiation and those which concentrate 
upon the naval engagements  and naval establishments  that  characterized 
the later phases of the American policy.    Within these groups have 
occurred revisionist  insurrections,   seeking each to speak upon particu- 
lar sins of  commission. 
The most useful single work of  the diplomatic histories is Ray 
Irwin, The Diplomatic Relations of the United  States with the Barbary 
Powers  (Chapel Hill.   1939).     Masterful  in the use of primary source 
materials,  Irwin analyzes American policy in terms of the opinions and 
direction of the consuls  in North Africa.     Louis Wright and Julia 
Macleod, The First Americans  in North Africa  (Princeton,  1945), James 
Field, America and the Mediterranean World   (Princeton, 1945)  and 
C. 0.  Paullin,   Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778- 
1883  (Johns Hopkins,   1912)   continue the tradition of primary emphasis 
on diplomatic affairs. 
The navalists'   foremost  advocates are Gardener Allen, Our Navy 
and the Barbary Corsairs   (Boston,  1905)   and C.   0. Paullin, History of 
Naval Administration   (Annapolis,   1968).     Allen is concerned,  through 
great exactitude,  with the movements and actions of American naval 
operations in the Mediterranean.     Paullin's History is a collection 
of early essays   (1905-14)   on the development of  the naval establishment, 
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with particular emphasis on political issues. 
Marshall Smelser,  Congress Founds the Navy,  1778-1798 (Notre Dame, 
1959) regards, with Paullin,  the navy as  an essentially Federalist crea- 
tion, but approaches  the navy through political processes, rather    than 
approaching the political process  through the navy,   as Paullin does. 
Smelser believes that  the Barbary problem had considerable relevance 
to the establishment   of  a navy. 
Julia Macleod's  article  "Jefferson and the Navy:    A Defense," 
Huntington Library Quarterly  (February,  1945)   is a brilliant revisionist 
approach to the overemphasis of sectional and partisan   (Federalist) 
influences  in Smelser and Harold and Margaret Sprout,  The Rise of American 
Naval Power  (Princeton,  1939).     Macleod firmly establishes Jefferson's 
naval ideas  as arising from his  concern with the Barbary issue, and 
divides Jefferson's  opinion from those of his Republican comrades. 
General diplomatic histories tend to be brief:     Robert Ferrell, 
American Diplomacy   (New York,  1975)   and Thomas Baily,  A Diplomatic History 
of the American People   (New Jersey,   1974)   spend,  respectively, three 
pages and four paragraphs  on the Barbary Wars.     Both agree that the 
foreign threat of  the  Barbary pirates  contributed to domestic unity, 
but both also  fail to make  clear that policy towards the Barbary States 
underwent a long evolution. 
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SCOTT, JEAN PEARSON.  Construction of an Objective Instrument 
of Moral Stage Preferences from the Kohlberg Moral Judgment 
Interview.  (1975)  Directed by:  Dr. Rebecca M. Smith. 
Pp. 109. 
The purpose of the study was to construct a valid and 
reliable objective instrument which would assess moral 
stage preferences. Validity was measured in terms of how 
well the scores of the proposed instrument correlated with 
the scores from the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview (1975). 
Two objective instruments, a Likert and a forced-choice 
measurement, were devised and administered to the subjects. 
The Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview, form A, (1975) was 
also administered. 
A non-random sample of 20 seventh grade students from 
a small southern town and 21 undergraduate students who 
attended a state-supported southern university were ran- 
domly assigned to groups that varied in the order of presen- 
tation of the three instruments.  Based upon previous research 
(Kohlberg, 1958; Turiel, 1966) demonstrating the develop- 
mental nature of moral reasoning, it was anticipated that 
college subjects would show significantly higher stage scores 
than the seventh grade subjects on all the instruments. 
Analysis of the data for differences between groups 
and within groups was done by procedures of analysis of var- 
iance and t-tests. Test-retest reliability coefficients 
were computed by the Pearson products-moment statistic as 
were the validity coefficients. 
V 
The college sample showed a higher moral stage than 
the seventh grade sample on all three instruments, but to 
a significant degree (p <.01) only on the interview.  The 
validity correlation coefficients for the comparison of 
the Likert instrument and the forced-choice instrument with 
the interview were .41 and .68, respectively.  It could 
not be concluded that the two instruments were valid meas- 
ures of the thinking that would presumably be elicited by 
the interview.  However, with revisions, it is believed 
that a valid objective instrument is quite feasible. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the goal of moral education has been the 
development of character. Responsibility for moral educa- 
tion or character development lay primarily with the public 
schools, Boy Scouts, and other organizations interested in 
teaching virtues.  Morality was conceptualized as a set of 
character traits (e.g. honesty, trustworthiness) which were 
internalized by the child through moral training.  Thus, 
moral education stressed obedience to the conventional moral 
code and the planning of group or individual activities which 
would manifest virtue or good works in terms of this code 
(Jones, 1936).  Research evaluation of the results of moral 
education classes in the public schools during the 1920s 
and 30s was based on tests of increased moral knowledge 
(verbal espousal of conventional rules) and an increase in 
virtuous behavior as experimentally measured.  Hartshorne 
and May (1928) found no significant change in the moral 
behavior of the moral education classes.  Considerable doubt 
was thrown on the notion that moral traits or virtues could 
be taught and, consequently, a decline in formal moral edu- 
cation programs followed. 
Recent theoretical development and research efforts 
have shifted the emphasis from a concern about morality or 
support of societal right and wrong to a concern about moral 
development.  Piaget (1932). and most recently, Kohlberg 
(1958) have used a cognitive-developmental approach to the 
study of moral development.  The cognitive-developmental 
approach is based largely upon Piaget's theory of cognitive 
development in that moral development is viewed as an intel- 
lectual process that parallels cognitive development (Kohl- 
berg . 1969). Moral thinking, like cognitive development, 
results from a continuous interaction between the structures 
of the environment and the structures of the organism.  As 
the organism interacts with his environment new structures 
of adaptation develop which are qualitatively different from 
the previous structural mode.  Kohlberg (1958) has formulated 
a hierarchy of six stages of moral development each of which 
is more integrated and more structurally advanced than the 
previous stage. 
A cognitive developmental approach to moral development 
has generated not only research but also a renewed interest 
in moral education.  On the basis of recent research find- 
ings (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1973; Turiel, 1966; Turiel & Rothman, 
1972), Kohlberg (1973a) has elaborated a cognitive-develop- 
mental approach to moral education for use in the public 
schools.  The approach is based on cross-cultural and longi- 
tudinal research providing evidence that moral development 
is an orderly process of passage through culturally universal, 
sequential, and invariant stages.  In contrast to 
conventional moral education, Kohlberg's approach stresses 
arousal of cognitive dissonance in students' thinking about 
moral issues and the exposure of students to reasoning one 
stage above (+1) the student's own stage. 
The first research to apply developmental principles to 
a moral education program explored the effects of guided 
peer discussion about moral dilemma situations (Blatt & 
Kohlberg, 1973).  The Blatt and KOhlberg (1973) study demon- 
strated the effectiveness of a program of guided moral dis- 
cussion in the public school milieu.  The study has been 
replicated in six classrooms, in work with prisoners, and 
with undergraduate students (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1973). 
The curriculum of the developmental approach focuses on 
a series of moral dilemmas which both the students and 
teacher discuss.  Each dilemma situation is designed to cre- 
ate dissonance with the students' currently held moral 
beliefs.  Discussion between students at adjacent moral 
stages is encouraged by an examination of the adequacy of the 
reasoning behind the student's arguments.  The teacher will 
begin by supporting and clarifying statements one stage high- 
er than the lowest stage held by the group.  Later, the 
teacher will challenge the reasoning at the +1 stage by sup- 
porting and clarifying reasoning at two stages higher than 
the lowest represented stage.  This procedure requires that 
the teacher assess each student's present moral stage, use 
the knowledge of this stage by clarifying arguments one 
stage higher, focus on reasoning, and help students exper- 
ience the kind of conflict that will facilitate movement to 
a more adequate organization of belief (Blatt & Kohlberg, 
1973). 
In order to assess students' current stage of moral 
reasoning, Kohlberg has used an individual, oral interview 
which gets at students' underlying moral reasoning structure 
through questions and through in-depth probing of responses. 
The interview is lengthy and difficult to score without con- 
siderable training. 
Realizing the impracticality of administering Kohlberg's 
interview to large groups of students in school situations, 
Schwara (1974) designed and validated a written instrument 
similar in content to the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview 
(1958).  Two instruments were designed and used in the study, 
one of which was an open-end questionnaire requiring self- 
structured responses, the other was an objective multiple- 
choice instrument with each of the six stages represented 
in the choices.  The multiple-choice instrument was not 
validated because all subjects regardless of age picked 
high stage responses.  Schwarz (1974) suggested that subjects 
may have responded to "best"-sounding items rather than to 
answers which were truly comprehended.  Rest's (1958) study 
corroborates this explanation. 
Thus, the following question poses itself.  Can a valid, 
objective test of moral developmental stage preferences be 
designed? The present study addressed itself to this problem. 
Presently, scoring of the open-end instrument (Schwarz, 
1974) is an involved, time-consuming procedure.  However, 
the preliminary work by Schwarz (1974) needs to be continued. 
An objective test that can be administered in a relatively 
short amount of time and can be accurately and quickly scored 
by classroom teachers is urgently needed if programs of moral 
education are to be implemented and evaluated in the public 
school system. 
Definitions 
Moral development. 
A continual process of matching a moral view to 
one's experience of life in a social world. 
Experiences of conflict in this process gene- 
rate movement from structural stage to structural 
stage.  (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 119) 
Stages of development. Equilibrated modes of interaction 
or modes of thought characterized by the following: 
1. Stages imply distinct or qualitative differ- 
ences in structures (modes of thinking) which 
still serve the same basic function (e.g.. 
intelligence) at various points in development. 
2. These different structures form an invariant 
sequence, order or succession in individual 
development. 
3. Each of these different and sequential modes 
of thought forms a 'structural whole.• 
4. Stages are hierarchical integrations... 
stages form an order of increasingly dif- 
ferentiated and integrated structures to 
fulfill a common function.  (KOhlberg & 
Turiel, 1973, p. 4) 
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Morality.  Morality refers to the process of labeling behav- 
ior aa right or wrong in accordance with cultural codes or 
a prescribed set of beliefs.  Morality is a result of sociali- 
zation or conditioning and is not developmental in nature. 
Objective test.  While there are varying degrees of objec- 
tivity in research instruments, for the purposes of this 
study the following definition will be used:  A measurement 
instrument in which scoring variance is at a minimum.  The 
scoring method permits a high degree of inter-observer agree- 
ment because subjects make marks on paper, the marks being 
restricted to two or more choices among alternatives sup- 
plied by the researcher (Kerlinger, 1964). 
Scope and Limitations of the Study 
The purpose of the study was to design a valid and 
reliable objective test of preference for moral develop- 
mental stage.  Validity and reliability were assessed by the 
procedures of concurrent validity and test-retest reliabil- 
ity, respectively. 
The study was limited to two, non-random population 
samples including a group of 20 seventh graders enrolled in 
a public elementary school in a small southern town and a 
group of 20 college students attending a state-supported 
university located in a small southern city. 
CHAPTER II 
THE REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The review of literature will include a summary of the 
research pertinent to the cognitive developmental theory of 
moral development.  A detailed discussion of the cognitive- 
developmental theories of Piaget and Kohlberg (which form 
the theoretical basis for the present study) were presented 
by Schwarz (1974).  To avoid redundancy they will not be 
dwelt upon here.  A description of moral education in his- 
torical perspective will provide the background in which to 
consider Kohlberg's moral education program. The cognitive- 
developmental approach to moral education will be discussed 
as well as its relationship to other contemporary programs 
that deal with moral values. 
Moral Education in Historical Perspective 
Traditionally the term "moral education" and "character 
education" have been used interchangeably in the literature. 
In order to avoid confusion the term "character education" 
will be used to refer to traditional attempts at moral 
education while moral education will be used to refer to 
Kohlberg's cognitive developmental program. 
The close association of church and school in colonial 
times prompted an emphasis on development of character early 
in United States educational history.  Moral education and 
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religious education were considered one and the same.  Often 
the same building was used for both worship and school. 
Equally as often, the minister was the teacher, and usually 
religious materials—Bibles, hymnbooks, and catechism- 
were used regularly in schools.  Many of the first textbooks 
were expressly moral in their material, with the separation 
of church and state, secularization of American education 
followed.  Parkin's (McKnown, 1935) investigation of moral 
and religious content of 1,291 American school readers 
covering the period 1776 to 1920 illustrates the shift from 
religious and moral content to subject matter of a nonmoral 
nature. From 1776 to 1786 100% of the content was religious 
or of a moral nature, but by 1916 only 5% of reading mater- 
ial contained moral content.  State laws prohibiting relig- 
ious instruction in the schools led to further deemphasia 
on moral instruction.  In 1894 Charles De Garmo deplored the 
lack of moral instruction in the schools.  He believed char- 
acter education to have an important place in the regular 
subjects of the curriculum, particularly social science. 
Teachers, schools, and some school systems began to imple- 
ment programs of character education, usually on their own 
initiative. McKnown (1935) described a number of the suc- 
cessful programs. 
By the turn of the century educators believed character 
education to be one of the primary objectives of the public 
school system.  However, controversy centered around a host 
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of issues, the primary ones being these:  (a) what was the 
nature of character; (b) what place did it have in the school 
curriculum; (c) how was it to be taught; and (d) what were 
the objectives of character education. 
Central to a theory of character education was the 
resolution of the question:  Is character what a person is 
or what he does?  Por some educators, character was con- 
ceived as the learning of socially acceptable habits of 
behavior and thought.  Moral behavior became automatic 
through the practice of good habits, such as courtesy, so 
that thought was required only for new situations.  Indeed, 
it was feared by some that conscious attention to matters 
of right and wrong would instill doubt in students.  Self- 
questioning could be a dangerous consequence of moral instruc- 
tion (Dept. of Superintendence, 1932) if children were left 
with doubts about correct behavior.  Another predominant 
view held that morality was a composite of character traits. 
By the learning and practice of certain virtues, the student 
became virtuous.  Regardless of whether character was some 
personality construct or a set of virtuous habits, both views 
centered upon the internalization of good behavior as de- 
fined by prevailing convention.  McKnown gave this defini- 
tion:  "Character is the sum total of an individual's inner 
traits as represented by his conduct" (McKnown, 1935, p. 1). 
In 1932, the Commission on Character Education under 
the Department of Superintendence, attempted to formulate 
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some guides and clarify some of the issues surrounding char- 
acter education.  At this time whether character consisted 
of conformity or self-determinism was in dispute.  While the 
Committee believed that conformity to conventional mores 
was an incomplete definition of character, the definition 
proposed by the Committee was vague and equally inadequate. 
The definition emphasized doing the best thing possible 
in each situation. 
The objective remains the discovery or creation 
of a way of living which conserves and produces 
as many values as possible for as many persons 
as possible over as long a time as possible. 
Character education is the facilitation of this 
way of life.  (Dept. of Superintendence, 1932, 
p. 59) 
Seventeen other major types of objectives for character 
education were listed and their strengths and inadequacies 
discussed (Dept. of Superintendence, 1932).  The Committee 
concluded that not enough scientific evidence was available 
to resolve all questions about the nature of character. 
By the early 30s the literature was full of demands 
for more character education in the schools (Charters, 
1928; Pishback, 1928; Heaton, 1933; Jones, 1936).  Schemes 
were devised that ranged from a direct method of teaching 
of a carefully planned formal course of instruction through 
a less formal method of using slogans, codes of ethics, and 
observing special days, to the indirect method of informal 
character development through the curriculum and regular 
school activities.  By the mid thirties these trends were 
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noted in the character education movement:  (a) decreasing 
use of formalized methods and an increase in the utilization 
of opportunities in the school setting affording the student 
practice in his real world; (b) a decreasing emphasis on 
personal goodness and an increasing attention to social 
responsibility and citizenship; and (c) an increasing empha- 
sis on the completeness of the student's life rather than 
to particularized and separate elements in the pupil's 
life (McKnown. 1935). 
By 1950 emphases in character education had changed 
only slightly.  The major emphasis was on the involvement 
of the student in real life experiences appropriate for his 
age and ability to promote optimum character development. 
Character education was considered coextensive with the 
entire educational development of the child (Metropolitan 
School Study Council, I9b0). 
Methods of evaluating the students' character and the 
curriculum in terms of character development were needed by 
educators.  Aided by the impetus of the research movement, 
several advancements in the development of measurement tech- 
niques for character were made in the 1920s.  Shuttleworth 
(1930) noted some of these changes:  (a) the improvement of 
rating devices, (b) the measurement of moral knowledge, (c) 
the use of pen-and-paper tests for the measurement of certain 
aspects of character, (d) an emphasis on the study of conduct, 
and (e) a refinement of the technique of controlled observa- 
tion.  The variety of pen-and-paper tests included 
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opinionnaires, self-description measures, measures of signif- 
icant knowledge, and disguised tests that included nonrele- 
vant items.  Other methods of evaluation included the meas- 
urement of conduct in controlled situations, evaluation of 
reputation, and frequent reports of certain kinds of behavior. 
The Hartshorne and May character studies (1928-1930) contrib- 
uted significantly to the development of measurement tech- 
niques.  The Department of Superintendence (1932) listed 
nearly 100 tests designed to assess character.  The diffi- 
culties in attempting to evaluate character stemmed from the 
multitude of inadequate definitions about the nature of 
character and the constantly changing standards of society. 
Measures of all-around character capable of administration 
in an hour or less were not believed to be feasible. 
The early research in character education included 
correlational and experimental designs. While the studies 
were numerous—particularly correlational studies—the method- 
ology and controls were unsatisfactory.  The most significant 
and intensive study, that of the Character Education Inquiry 
directed by Hartshorne and May (1928-1930), collected a great 
many correlational observations about character traits, 
specifically honesty, service, self-control.  A major finding 
was that behavior was situation specific. The average cor- 
relation coefficient between one behavior test and another 
of the same trait or virtue rarely exceeded .20.  Most of 
the educational forces studied were found to bear little 
relationship to the behavior measured.  Physical condition, 
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school grade, character building clubs, Boy Scouts, and 
summer camps seemed to have no general effect on virtuous 
behavior.  The finding of greatest educational import was 
the difference in honesty of children in "old-type" and 
"new-type" schools.  There was a greater tendency for child- 
ren attending modern schools to cheat less on tests.  These 
modern schools were described as those which used a "pro- 
ject" approach to studies and put less emphasis on grades 
and tests and more emphasis on the intrinsic value of the 
activity itself.  It was concluded that character was a 
social phenomenon, heavily dependent upon the particular 
situation.  Formalized instruction for the teaching of ideals 
and standards was of little value as a method of character 
education (Hartshorne & May, 1928-1930). 
Moral Developmental Theory 
Piaget (1932) was probably the first investigator 
to view moral development as a decision-making process that 
was dependent upon the individual's level of cognitive 
ability. He identified two stages of moral development— 
the heteronomous stage and the autonomous stage.  The latter 
stage was believed to be reached by the age of 11 or 12, 
after a transition from heteronomous thinking, and to per- 
sist throughout adulthood. 
Influenced by Piaget, Kohlberg undertook a study to 
analyze moral judgment in subjects aged 10, 13, and 16 
(Kohlberg, 1958).  The cognitive levels of these ages were 
14 
assumed to be different as theorized by Piaget.  An inter- 
view consisting of nine hypothetical moral dilemmas where 
obedience to authority conflicted with human need or the 
welfare of other individuals was conducted with each subject. 
From these data, Kohlberg formulated six stages of moral 
development grouped under three levels as follows: 
TABLE OF MORAL STAGES 
Preconventional Level 
At this level the child is responsive to cultural 
rules and labels of good and bad, right and wrong, 
but interprets these labels in terms of either the 
physical or the hedonistic consequences of action 
(punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in 
terms of the physical power of those who enunciate 
the rules and labels.  The level is divided into 
the following two stages. 
Stage 1 
The punishment and obedience orientation. 
The physical consequences of action deter- 
mine its goodness or badness regardless of 
the human meaning or value of these conse- 
quences.  Avoidance of punishment and 
unquestioning deference to power are 
valued in their own right, not in terms 
of respect for an underlying moral order 
supported by punishment and authority 
(the latter being stage 4). 
Stage 2 
The instrumental relativist orientation. 
Right action consists of that which instru- 
mentally satisfies one's own needs and 
occasionally the needs of others.  Human 
relations are viewed in terms like those 
of the market place.  Elements of fairness, 
of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are 
present, but they are always interpreted 
in a physical, pragmatic way.  Reciprocity 
is a matter of "you scratch my back and 
I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, 
gratitude, or justice. 
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Conventional Level 
At this level, maintaining the expectations of 
the individual's family, group or nation is per- 
ceived as valuable in its own right, regardless 
of immediate and obvious consequences.  The atti- 
tude is not only one of conformity to personal 
expectations and social order but of loyalty to 
it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and jus- 
tifying the order, and of identifying with the 
persons or group involved in it. At this level, 
there are the following two stages. 
Stage 3 
The interpersonal concordance or "good boy— 
nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that 
which pleases or helps others and is approved 
by them.  There is much conformity to stereo- 
typical images of what is majority or "natural" 
behavior.  Behavior is frequently judged by 
intention—"he means well" becomes important 
for the first time. One earns approval by 
being "nice." 
Stage 4 
The law and order orientation.  There is orien- 
tation toward authority, fixed rules, and the 
maintenance of social order. Right behavior 
consists of doing one's duty, showing respect 
for authority, and maintaining the given social 
order for its own sake. 
Poatconventional or Principled Level 
At this level, there is a clear effort to define 
moral values and principles which have validity 
and application apart from the authority of the 
groups or persons holding these principles and 
apart from the individual's own identification 
with these groups.  This level again has two 
stages, which are as follows. 
Stage S 
The social-contract legalistic orientation, 
generally with utilitarian overtones.  Right 
action tends to be defined in terms of 
general individual rights and standards 
which have been critically examined and 
agreed upon by the whole society. There 
is a clear awareness of the relativism of 
personal values and opinions and a corres- 
ponding emphasis upon procedural rules for 
reaching consensus.  Aside from what is con- 
stitutionally and democratically agreed upon. 
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the right is a matter of personal "values" 
and "opinion." The result is an emphasis 
upon the "legal point of view," but with an 
emphasis upon the possibility of changing 
law in terms of rational considerations of 
social utility (rather than freezing it in 
terms of stage 4 "law and order").  Outside 
the legal realm, free agreement and contract 
is the binding element of obligation. 
Stage 6 
The universal ethical principle orientation. 
Right is defined by the decision of consci- 
ence in accord with self-chosen ethical 
principles appealing to logical comprehen- 
siveness, universality, and consistency. 
These principles are abstract and ethical 
(the Golden Rule, the categorical impera- 
tive):  they are not concrete moral rules 
like the Ten Commandments.  At heart, these 
are universal principles of justice, of the 
reciprocity and equality of human rights, 
and of respect for the dignity of human 
beings as individual persons.  (Penton 
et al.. 1974, p. 2) 
Analysis of difference in groups in usage of all types of 
thought but one (stage 3) were found to be significant 
beyond the .01 level. 
Kramer (1969) followed up Kohlberg's subjects in a 
longitudinal study in which subjects were again tested 
for stage of moral thinking at the age of 25.  Two of Kra- 
mer's hypotheses were supported, the first being that mature 
moral thinking is achieved by the mid twenties.  Secondly, 
high school scores are highly predictive of adult scores. 
Kohlberg and Turiel (1973) reinterpreted these findings 
after their research produced evidence that the first 
hypothesis was not supported.  Although Kramer found that 
subjects in college appeared to regress in moral thinking to 
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a typical stage 2 orientation, upon reexamination, it was 
found that a major difference between college regressors 
and stage 2 thinkers was the relativism and the higher level 
of abstraction of the former group.  What was morally right 
was based upon the subject's wishes, but the relativism of 
the decision was also expressed. The structure of the 
responses of "college regressors," which was then desig- 
nated stage 4B, instead of stage 2, was a transition stage 
that indicated some advancement over the "law and order" 
stage 4, however, reasoning was not structurally differentia- 
ted to a degree to be a stage, separate and apart from, and 
higher than stage 4.  Interestingly, college students inter- 
viewed in the last year (June '74-June '75) have not been 
found to be using stage 4B thinking but tend to use more con- 
ventional stage 4 (Kohlberg summer workshop, 1975). 
It was postulated that perhaps a different type of 
experience is required to attain principled levels of moral 
judgment than is required for the previous stages (Kohlberg 
& Turiel, 1973).  Social experiences appear to play an 
increasingly important role in higher stage development. 
Kohlberg's subjects who attended college eventually reached 
stage 5 thinking while subjects not attending college had 
not attained principled levels of thinking (Kohlberg & Tur- 
iel, 1973).  Kohlberg has further hypothesized that moral 
development continues throughout the adult years and that a 
possible seventh stage exists (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1973). 
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No research has been reported to substantiate the presence 
of this stage 7, however. 
Basic to a developmental stage typology were the follow- 
ing stage characteristics postulated by Kohlberg: 
1. Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences 
in structure (modes of thinking) which still serve 
the same basic function (e.g. intelligence) at 
various points in development. 
2. These different structures form an invariant se- 
quence, order or succession in individual develop- 
ment. 
3. Each of these different and sequential modes of 
thought forms a "structural whole." 
4. Stages are hierarchical integrations...stages form 
an order of increasingly differentiated and inte- 
grated structures to fulfill a common function 
(Kohlberg & Turiel, 1973, p. 4). 
Kohlberg's (1958) study did not demonstrate that the 
attainment of one stage was prerequisite to the attainment 
of the next higher stage of thought.  Turiel (1966) tested 
two propositions from Kohlberg's stage theory: 
(a) that stages form an invariant sequence, and, 
thus, more learning results from exposure to the 
stage directly above one's level than to stages 
further above; (b) that passages from one stage 
to the next involves integration of the previous 
stages, and thus, more learning results from 
exposure to the stage directly above than to the 
stage directly below,  (p. 11) 
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Forty-four subjects designated as being at either stages 2, 
3, or 4 were distributed among three experimental groups 
and one control group. The treatment condition consisted 
of subjects' being exposed to reasoning either on the stage 
directly below, the stage directly above, or two stages above 
the initial dominant stage. The hypotheses were confirmed 
as exposure to the stage directly above was the most effec- 
tive treatment. 
A study to replicate Turiel's (1966) findings of invar- 
iant sequentiality of the six stages was conducted with 22 
fifth grade subjects and 23 eighth grade subjects (Rest, 
Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969). In addition. Rest et al. were 
interested in investigating the relationship of a subject's 
own mode of reasoning with comprehension, preference, and 
assimilation of other stages.  It was hypothesized that 
(a) subjects would prefer stages higher than their own 
stage and reject those stages below their own; (b) sub- 
jects would comprehend all stages below their own and find 
higher stages increasingly difficult to comprehend; and 
(c) these two tendencies—to prefer higher stages, but to 
find higher stages increasingly difficult to understand— 
would interact so that subjects would assimilate a stage 
that was (+1) one higher than their own stage of reasoning 
most readily into their existing scheme of moral reasoning. 
Each subject's predominant stage was assessed by means of 
a pretest interview consisting of five stories from the 
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Kohlberg interview (1958).  During the experimental session 
the subjects were exposed to stories with conflict situations. 
Three sets of advice were presented which posed possible 
solutions to the conflict.  Two bits of advice represented 
one stage (-1) below the subject's own predominant stage. 
Likewise, two bits of advice were at a stage (+1) higher 
than the subject's own stage and two bits of advice repre- 
sented two stages (+2) higher than the predominant stage of 
the subject.  The two bits of advice were alternative courses 
of action given for each stage so that answers would be based 
on the reasoning given and not on the behavioral decision. 
The subjects were asked to indicate their preferences for the 
given advice, to explain the given advice in their own words 
based upon recall, and to give their own solution to the 
dilemma.  The results substantiated Turiel's (1966) find- 
ings of invariant aequentiality and thus supported Kohl- 
berg's stage hypotheses.  Children preferred higher stage 
statements regardless of whether the statements were +1 or 
+2 stages above theirs and rejected statements a stage below 
theirs.  However, stages above the subject's own stage were 
increasingly difficult to comprehend as ascertained by the 
subject's ability to correctly recall the advice at the 
given stage.  In order to determine the degree of assimi- 
lation of the experimental advice, stage usage on the pretest 
interview was compared to the stage usage of the subject's 
own advice given in the experimental session.  Usage of +1 
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advice definitely increased over that expected from the fre- 
quency of pretest +1 usage. There was no increase in +2 
usage and only a slight increase in -1 usage.  It appeared 
that the combination of preference and comprehension of 
stages other than the subject's own stage resulted in op- 
tional assimilation of +1 reasoning. This was the first 
study to investigate stage preferences elicited from a writ- 
ten instrument.  Consequently, this study has special rele- 
vance for the purposes of the present study. 
Kohlberg's major assumptions have been supported by the 
research to date.  Studies have provided substantial evidence 
of an invariant sequential hierarchy of Kohlberg's six devel- 
opmental stages (Kohlberg, 1969;  Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969; 
Kohlberg & Turiel, 1973; Rest. Turiel, & Kohlberg, 1969; 
Turiel, 1966).  There are many areas which are yet unex- 
plored—preschool reasoning, adult moral development, envir- 
onmental factors affecting moral development, as well as the 
nature of stage transition periods. 
A major impediment for investigators attempting to 
replicate Kohlberg's work is the interim nature of the Kohl- 
berg Moral Judgment Interview and the complex scoring proced- 
ure.  The format of the interview itself and the scoring 
procedure have undergone continuous revisions reflecting new 
theoretical understanding.  Revised scoring procedures have 
made as much as a 20% difference in the scoring of studies 
completed five years ago and earlier (Kohlberg summer 
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workshop, 1975). Therefore, results of older studies cannot 
be taken literally. There is definitely a need to produce 
a final form of the interview and a simplified scoring system 
or a more objective instrument. Recognizing this need, the 
Moral Education Center at Harvard, under the direction of 
Kohlberg, has plans underway to further revise the scoring 
procedure. 
Prerequisites for Moral Reasoning 
Two conditions necessary for moral reasoning stage 
transition are these:  (a) attainment of certain levels of 
cognitive ability and (b) attainment of certain role-taking 
abilities.  Individuals pass through stages of logical 
thought and stages of role-taking ability as well as through 
stages of moral reasoning in a parallel fashion. The first 
step involves the acquisition of certain cognitive structures, 
Piaget found that individuals pass through major sequential 
periods:  (a) the sensorirootor period, (b) the operational 
period, and (c) the formal operational period.  Around age 7, 
children move into the concrete operational perioa.  The 
child is able to make logical inferences, classify things, 
and handle quantitative relations about concrete phenomena. 
At adolescence, most, but not all, individuals enter the 
formal operational stage. At this stage the ability to 
reason abstractly, to consider possibilities, to consider 
the relations between elements in a system, and to form 
hypotheses are acquired. Many individuals do not reach the 
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higher levels of formal thought. While they may be able to 
consider all the relations of one thing to another they may 
not be able to form hypotheses and deduce implications from 
hypotheses to be tested. While a certain level of logical 
reasoning ability is necessary for moral reasoning ability, 
it is not sufficient for the attainment of moral stage. 
It follows that an adult who can use abstract thinking at 
higher levels may not necessarily be able to think in terms 
of moral principles (stage 5 or 6).  Because logical reason- 
ing puts a ceiling on what stages of moral reasoning can be 
developed, an individual at the concrete operational stage 
of thinking cannot attain stage 3 moral reasoning without 
movement first to the lower levels of formal operational 
thought. Moral development depends upon logical development, 
but logical development does not depend upon moral develop- 
ment. 
Next, after stages of logical thought, comes the stage 
of social perspective which is the ability to take social 
roles.  Kohlberg defines social perspective as "the level 
at which the person sees other people, interprets their 
thoughts and feelings, and sees their role or place in 
society" (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 6). 
Selman's research (1975) into the development of inter- 
personal cognition or perspective-taking ability has led to 
the definition of six stages of social perspective-taking. 
In keeping with developmental theory, Selman and colleagues 
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have found in investigations of subjects, aged 4 to young 
adulthood, that each perspective-taking stage is a more 
integrated reorganization of the preceding stage and paves 
the way to the next higher stage. Children may go through 
each stage at different rates but always in the same order 
(Selman, 1975). These stages are very closely related to 
moral stage, but do not involve decisions of right and wrong. 
An individual may be able to take the perspective of a gen- 
eral member of society but not be able to resolve a moral 
issue in terms of societal welfare.  To make a decision in 
terms of values of justice is more difficult than to see the 
world from a social perspective (Kohlberg, 1975). The pre- 
conventional reasoner (stage 1 or 2) takes the perspective 
of a concrete individual considering his own interests and 
those of other individuals.  The conventional reasoner is 
able to take a member of society perspective.  He identifies 
with societal rules and expectations.  Post-conventional 
thinkers must take on a "prior to society" perspective. The 
postconventional person questions the member of society per- 
spective from an individual perspective that can be univer- 
sal for all individuals, not just those individuals of a par- 
ticular society.  Subsumed under each of the three social 
perspective levels are two stages which further define and 
differentiate each level. For example, the first stage of 
the "member of society" perspective considers the relation- 
ship of others in a shared relationship.  The stage 3 
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perspective of a member of society is that of the average 
good person. The individual sees things from the point of 
view of shared relationships between two or more individ- 
uals.  This is a less mature point of view than a point of 
view of the societal system or of society as a whole. Soc- 
ial role-taking is a necessary but not a sufficient condit- 
ion for progression to higher moral reasoning levels (Kohl- 
berg, 1975). 
While there is a vertical sequence in movement from 
moral stage 1 to moral stages 2 and 3, there must be a hori- 
zontal movement from cognitive ability to social perspective 
to moral reasoning. This vertical and horizontal progression 
is summarized below: 
Cognitive Stage3    Social Perspective 
Sensorimotor 
Period 
Concrete Opera- 
tional Period 
substage I 
substage II 
Formal Operational 
Period 
substage I 
substage II 
substage III 
Egocentric perspective 
taking 
Moral Stage 
Stage 0 
Individual Perspective Level I 
1. isolated individual   Stage 1 
point of view 
2. view of others in     Stage 2 
terms of self 
Societal Perspective 
3. mutual perspective 
taking 
4. qualitative-system 
perspective taking 
Level II 
Stage 3 
Stage 4 
Level III Prior to Society Per- 
spective 
5. symbolic interaction 
perspective taking  Stage 5 
Stage 6 
?Taken from Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971. 
Based upon Kohlberg, 1975; Selman, 1975. 
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First, a person attains a logical stags (e.g. formal opera* 
tions) that allows him to sae systems in the world and to 
view himself as a general member of society (stage 4).  Even- 
tually he is able to define right and wrong in terms of 
that system's welfare (moral stage 4). 
Conditions for Moral Behavior 
The terms "moral reasoning" and "moral behavior" are 
often confused.  While moral reasoning involves judgments, 
behavior in moral conflict situations results from an inter- 
action of moral reasoning level, personality factors, and 
many environmental factors.  The ability to reason maturely 
about issues of fairness does not guarantee moral behavior. 
All the variables represented in the diagram below must be 
considered: 
Moral reasoning level + situational factors + perso- 
nality factors + factual information —> Behavior 
(KOhlberg summer workshop, 1975) 
Several studies have shown an examination of the effects 
of moral reasoning level on behavior.  Turiel and Rothman 
(1972) designed a study to determine the effects of exposure 
to moral reasoning on behavioral choice.  Forty-three seventh 
and eighth grade boys were pretested using Kohlberg's moral 
judgment interview.  The experimental session required sub- 
jects to choose between two actions.  Before choosing, the 
subjects were exposed to two lines of reasoning. The first 
was one stage above the subject's own stage and the second 
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line of reasoning was one stage below that of the subjects. 
A posttest revealed no significant stage changes. However, 
while subjects at stage 2 or 3 did not make any change in 
behavioral choice, stage 4 subjects did make a change in 
behavioral choice when exposed to reasoning one stage higher. 
These findings suggest that further investigations into the 
relationship between the individual's reasoning, the reason- 
ing of others, and their behavioral choices would be valua- 
ble (Turiel & Rothman, 1972). 
Kohlberg (1969) reported that when college subjects 
were exposed to an experimental session where they had a 
chance to cheat, only 11% of the principled subjects cheated 
as opposed to 42% of the conventional subjects.  He explained 
this finding by the fact that principled subjects defined 
the issue as one involving maintaining an implicit contract 
with the experimenter and also as one reflecting the inequal- 
ity of taking advantage by cheating. These conditions still 
would hold even in situations with ambiguous social expecta- 
tions.  The conventional subjects, on the other hand, found 
the experimental condition one of confused social expecta- 
tions—the authority figure (experimenter) had not expressed 
any opinion about cheating and had left the experimental room 
unsuperviseU.  While the issue for the conventional subject 
was to uphold conventional expectations of the authority 
figure or expectations of others, he was provided with no 
real reason not to cheat if the authority figure did not 
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care and others were cheating. The critical break appeared 
to be between conventional subjects and poatconventional 
subjects. This finding was also substantiated in other 
studies (Kohlberg, 1969). 
Milgram (1963) set up a situation where subjects were 
faced with disobeying the rules formulated by an authority 
figure who was violating the rights of another individual. 
The experimenter ordered the subjects to give an increasingly 
severe electric shock to a confederate of the experimenter 
who had agreed to participate in a nonsense-syllable learn- 
ing experiment.  In this study 75% (of a group of six) of 
stage 6 subjects quit the experimental session as compared 
to 13% of the remaining of 24 subjects at lower stages 
(Kohlberg, 1969). 
It must be pointed out that moral behavior is not vir- 
tuous in and of itself. Rather it is the reasoning behind 
the action which incorporates aims of justice which makes an 
act morally just.  In fact, most moral dilemmas dictate 
several courses of action none of which would be an exclus- 
ively principled action. A study of Berkeley students who 
did and did not participate in a free speech sit-in indicated 
that 80% of the stage 6 subjects sat-in as compared to 10% 
of the conventional subjects and 50% of the stage 5 subjects. 
A majority of the stage 2 subjects sat-in, but for much dif- 
ferent reasons than the stage 6 participants (Kohlberg, 
1969). 
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Results of the moral action studies tend to concur that 
there is a meaningful relationship between principled level 
thinking and mature moral action.  These findings offer 
additional support for moral education programs. While the 
immediate goal of moral education is the facilitation of more 
adequate modes of weighing decisions of fairness, ultimately 
it would be most validly predicated on the desire for more 
moral behavior. 
Coqnitive-Developtnental Moral Education 
Kohlberg presents a program of moral education that is 
grounded in both psychology and philosophy.  The program 
combines what moral development "is" as indicated by the 
research, and what moral development "ought to be" with 
regard to ends and values.  While science can speak to causal 
relationships it cannot speak about questions of virtue, 
truth, and values.  These value questions must be carefully 
considered as they are intrinsic to any moral education pro- 
gram. 
From the philosophic point of view, Kohlberg embraces 
a Platonic view of virtue or the good.  Virtue, rather than 
being a composite of parts, is one ideal form—called 
justice—which does not vary across cultures.  Knowledge of 
the good is philosophical knowledge or intuition of the ideal 
form of the good; it is not based on opinion or conventional 
beliefs. The good can be taught because it is known intui- 
tively at a low level and its teaching is, therefore, a 
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"calling out" rather than instruction. The teaching of vir- 
tue is the "asking of questions and the pointing of the way" 
rather than the giving of answers (Kohlberg, 1970). 
In contrast, the Aristotlian approach considered virtue 
to be either intellectual or moral virtue. Moral virtue came 
about by example and practice until virtuous habits were 
learned. This philosophy was carried over in traditional 
practices of character education.  Traditional educational 
practice divided the personality into traits of character 
or a "bag of virtues" as described in a preceding section. 
Kohlberg criticizes the "bag of virtues" approach just 
on the grounds that there is no such thing. Virtues and 
vices are merely labels of praise or blame that people award 
to others and which seem to have no direct influence on the 
individual faced with a moral conflict.  The list of virtues 
is long and every "bag" can be composed of any number or 
combination of virtues.  The result, concludes Kohlberg, of 
striving to acquire the virtues of everybody's "bag" is try- 
ing to be all things to all people.  The work of Hartshorne 
and May (1928-1930) demonstrated most convincingly the weak- 
nesses of this approach. 
Basic to Kohlberg's moral education approach is the 
universal nature of moral development.  In studies of 
diverse cultures (Malaysia, Taiwan, Mexico, U. S., and 
Turkey) Kohlberg found the same developmental sequence of 
his moral stages (Kohlberg, 1973b). Age trends of urban 
middle class boys in Mexico. Taiwan, and the United States 
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found the same sequence of use although Mexican and Taiwan 
subjects were a little slower in development.  The presence 
of stage 5 thinking in other countries indicated that the 
legal-contractual view was not a purely democratic moral 
value system (Kohlberg, 1973b). The same stage sequence was 
found for lower class urban subjects and isolated village 
subjects of differing cultures.  Subjects, regardless of 
religion or culture, tended to base moral decisions upon a 
developmental orientation to values of justice (Kohlberg, 
1973b). 
The only legitimate form of moral education is one that 
is based upon principles of justice, argues Kohlberg. The 
teaching of values of justice prohibit in and of themselves 
the imposition of beliefs of one group upon another. The 
Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution requires 
the recognition of equal rights of individuals.  The recog- 
nition of equal rights of individuals necessarily implies 
values of justice, not a "value-neutral" stance.  Individual 
rights may be respected without necessarily accepting a value 
system as equal as any other. 
According to the United States Constitution the ration- 
ale for government is the maintenance of justice or the pres- 
ervation of the rights of the individual. The public school 
as an institution is as much committed to preserving justice 
as is the government or court.  The school, then, transmits 
values of justice upon which any society is based. 
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Justice is not a character trait nor is it a concrete 
rule of action.  Rather it is a moral principle or as Kohl- 
berg defines it, "a principle is a mode of choosing which is 
universal, a rule of choosing which we want all people to 
adopt in all situations" (Kohlberg, 1970, pp. 69-70). 
Because morally mature men are governed by justice rather 
than by a set of rules, there are not many moral virtues, 
but one.  Drawing upon the Platonian view, what makes an 
act virtuous is knowledge of the good.  A courageous action 
based on ignorance of justice is not anymore a just act than 
a courageous act based on ignorance of danger.  It follows 
then that if virtuous action is based upon knowledge of the 
good, then virtue is one, since knowledge of the good is one 
(Kohlberg. 1970). 
Contrary to the bag of virtues approach, teaching know- 
ledge of the good is not an easy task.  Using a Socratic 
model, Kohlberg described the first step in the process of 
the understanding of the "good" as helping the student create 
dissatisfaction with his own thinking and secondly, exposing 
him to disagreement and argument about the reasoning with 
others.  As a result of this process the student will begin 
to see more adequate conceptualizations and the inadequacies 
of his reasoning. 
Blatt and Kohlberg (1973) carried out a moral discussion 
program in a Sunday school and in a public school. The Sun- 
day school study involving 30 children, aged 11-12, served as 
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the pilot study for the public school study.  Three compar- 
able control groups from Turiel's experiments (1966; Turiel 
& Rothman, 1972) were used as controls.  Pretests to deter- 
mine the subjects' present moral stage were administered 
using items from the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview.  The 
experimental group began a twelve week teaching program 
involving a total of 12 hours of discussion that was centered 
on a series of moral conflict situations different from those 
used in the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview.  The situa- 
tion exposed students to moral dilemmas aimed at arousing 
genuine moral conflict as to reasoning and choice.  Posttests 
demonstrated a significant (t=38, £ {.01) increase in moral 
stage scores as compared to the controls after the 12 week 
period as well as one year later.  Sixty-three percent of 
the experimental children moved up one stage or slightly 
more, 9%  moved up half a stage, and 28% remained at the same 
stage on the posttest.  In contrast, 5% (one of 21) of the 
control subjects showed a one stage increase from pretest. 
Results from the one year follow-up were basically unchanged. 
The second phase of the study (Blatt & Kohlberg. 1973) 
was an extension and replication of the first phase using 
subjects in a public junior and senior high school setting. 
Procedures were basically identical to the pilot study.  The 
two experimental groups met twice a week in 45 minute sess- 
ions for a total of 18 sessions.  As in the first study, 
the experimental classes attained significant increases in 
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moral stage maturity as compared to the controls and this 
increase was evident one year later.  The Blatt and Kohlberg 
(1973) study demonstrated the effectiveness of a program of 
guided moral discussion in the public school milieu.  This 
study has been replicated in six classrooms, in work with 
prisoners, and with undergraduate students (Blatt & Kohl- 
berg, 1973). 
Presently, Kohlberg and colleagues are engaged in pilot 
studies of public schools being run by the "just community 
approach."  Kohlberg argued that it is ludicrous to expect 
classroom moral education efforts to be effective when stu- 
dents spend their day in a school community that operates by 
authoritarian ideas of justice.  In the pilot studies the 
entire school community attempts to live w ithin af just sys- 
tem as opposed to restricting moral education solely to the 
classroom.  Students make their own rules and regulations and 
determine punishment for offenders. Reports are that the pro- 
gram has been successful, although no results have been pub- 
lished (Kohlberg, summer workshop 1975). 
The Relationship of Values Clarification to Moral Education 
The problem of dealing with moral values has long pre- 
sented educators with an almost unreaolvable dilemma.  The 
issue has generally focused upon criticisms of programs that 
were indoctrinating or took a relativistic stance.  A do- 
nothing approach obviously was not a satisfactory alternative 
because teachers must constantly be engaged in decisions of 
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right and wrong.  The moral atmosphere of the classroom is 
set by the way in which the teacher handles conflicts and by 
the values that are espoused as justification of the decis- 
ions made.  Inevitably, values are transmitted in the school 
environment regardless of whether the teacher consciously 
attempts to espouse them. Those who attempt to teach a 
set of prescribed virtues have no justification for the par- 
ticular values they wish to instill in students and thus the 
program cannot adequately counter the criticism that indoc- 
trination is its aim.  A popular contemporary approach that 
has taken the route of relativism will be briefly considered. 
The values-clarification approach to values education 
was an outgrowth of the humanistic movement in education. 
It was recognized that the technological innovations in soci- 
ety, the rate of change, and the number of alternatives with 
which the average individual had to deal had made it increas- 
ingly difficult for the growing child to develop clear val- 
ues of his own.  Educational methods were needed to help 
students learn to function in a complex and confusing world. 
The values-clarification approach, developed by Louis Raths, 
is a system of teaching designed to help students learn the 
process of valuing. Values are viewed as relative, per- 
sonal, and situational. Therefore, the approach focuses on 
how values are developed, not upon the teaching of a specific 
set of values (Raths et al, 1966). 
Persons experiencing value confusion have been identi- 
fied by idiosyncratic behavior patterns—"apathy, flightiness. 
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extreme uncertainty and inconsistency, drift, bverconformity. 
overdissention and chronic posing, and frequently under- 
achievement" (Raths, 1966). Persons who have attained value 
clarity are described as "positive, purposeful, enthusiastic 
and proud." The basic hypothesis of value theory is, 
If children are helped to use the valuing process, 
they will behave in ways that are less apathetic, 
confused, and irrational and in ways that are more 
positive, purposeful, and enthusiastic.  (Raths 
et al., 1966, p. 11) 
Raths et al. have identified seven valuing skills and 
have devised classroom techniques to help students learn 
those skills.  The skills are these: 
1. choosing from alternatives 
2. choosing after careful consideration of the conse- 
quences of each alternative 
3. choosing freely 
4. prizing, being glad of one's choice 
5. prizing, being willing to publicly affirm one's 
choice 
6. acting upon one's choice, incorporating choices 
into behavior 
7. acting upon one's choice repeatedly, over time 
(Raths, Harmon & Simon, 1966, p. 259) 
All seven criteria must be met for something to be called 
a value. Through these processes of choosing, prizing, and 
behaving individuals arrive at values through an intellec- 
tual process.  The critical thinking process is applied, 
however, to elements in the behavioral and affective domains 
Value theory has been subjected to very little empiri- 
cal examination. At the time of Rath's first book describ- 
ing values clarification, he reported 12 preliminary research 
studies, most of which lacked good design and control. 
Acknowledging the fact that the research was weak, Raths 
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believed that taken as a whole, there was evidence that val- 
ues clarification techniques did change patterns of behavior 
(e.g. from apathetic to purposeful and active). Recently 
Kirschenbaum (1975) has summarized 11 studies, many of which 
are unpublished or in press which appear to further sub- 
stantiate the success of values clarification strategies. 
Most of the studies employed a more sophisticated methodology 
and used larger samples than the studies first reported by 
Raths.  However, there remained some lack of control and 
some questionable measurement techniques. 
A major problem with values clarification research is 
the lack of accurate measurement techniques.  In most cases 
behavioral observations have been used with the aid of rating 
scales and some self-report measures.  Paper-and-pencil tests 
of values are not appropriate for an approach which focuses 
on behavior change.  Some paper-and-pencil measurement tools 
which assess self-actualization, self esteem and locus of 
control have been used to ascertain the effects of values 
clarification on these constructs. 
In an attempt to critically examine values clarifica- 
tion, Lockwood (in press) has focused on several problem 
areas.  Lockwood's strongest criticism of values clarifica- 
tion was the moral position it assumes—that of the moral 
relativist.  A moral relativist position asserts that every- 
one is entitled to hold the values he wants; there is no way 
of saying that one set of values is better than another.  A 
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fundamental argument against this approach is that relati- 
vism can be used to  justify virtually any activity an individ- 
ual engages  in.    Relativism provides no consistent guide for 
behavior. 
In addition,  relativism provides no satisfactory method 
for dealing with inter-personal conflicts of value.    Although 
the relativist may say that each individual's values are 
right  for him there are times when a resolution over con- 
flict  is necessary.    No satisfactory methods for resolving 
conflict can be  justified as superior to others when taking 
the relativist stance.     Blackmail,  majority rule,  bribery, 
rational debate or physical force are any number of ways 
that might be consistent with values people hold. 
Lockwood  (in press)  concluded that values clarification 
can not deal adequately with the complexities of value con- 
flict  issues.     It  is quite possible that a program grounded 
in ethical relativism will influence students to take a rela- 
tivist position,  too. 
Similarly,  Kohlberg (1973b) argues that relativity cannot 
be morally justified anymore than authoritarianism.    Values 
clarification  is in one sense an indoctrination of the belief 
that all values are equally valid.     Kohlberg asserts that 
this position  is scientifically and philosophically invalid 
and presents his research into moral development to support 
his contentions. 
The values clarification approach is a much broader 
program intended to deal with all types of values than 
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Kohlberg's moral education program. Kohlberg believes that 
the values clarification approach is a positive method for 
dealing with values that do not involve moral issues. 
Whether or not an individual wishes to leave his bed unmade 
is not a matter involving moral values. On the other hand, 
if an individual is faced with reporting a dishonest friend 
or lying to authorities clear moral issues are involved. 
The strategies devised to clarify values can be useful 
tools in stimulating moral reasoning and for this reason 
values-clarification can be a useful component of moral 
education. 
Focus of the Research. 
Kohlberg's proposed moral education program would avoid 
the problems of a nonempirical and indoctrinating stance 
that was taken by proponents of character education.  It is 
argued that values clarification, a contemporary teaching 
approach, is a useful teaching strategy, but that its value- 
neutral stance on moral issues is inadequate, character 
education and value education have had difficulty in assess- 
ing their program objectives due to inadequate measurement 
techniques for assessing behavior.  Kohlberg's theory and 
investigations into moral development suggest that moral 
reasoning is an empirically valid and universal construct 
that can be measured.  These research results provide a basis 
for implementing programs in the school curriculum which would 
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match students1 level of moral reasoning with the next 
higher stage in the structural hierarchy.  Research results 
also provide a legitimate base for investigating practical 
means of assessing moral reasoning. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROCEDURE 
The purpose of the present study was to design and 
validate an objective measure of preference for moral stage. 
The design of the study will be presented first followed 
by a description of the sample.  The major efforts of the 
study were directed toward the development of the research 
instruments.  This preliminary work will be reported and 
the scoring procedure for each of the instruments will be 
detailed in a final section. 
Research Design 
Three instruments to assess moral developmental stage 
were used in the study.  These instruments were (a) a Likert 
questionnaire designed by the researcher (see Appendix A), 
(b) a forced-choice questionnaire designed by the researcher 
(see Appendix B), and (c) the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Inter- 
view (1975) (see Appendix C). 
Both age groups were administered all three instruments. 
Each age group was randomly divided into these four experi- 
mental groups (five subjects in each group) which determined 
the sequence of administration of the three instruments. 
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Experimental Groups 
A B CD 
Interview     Interview     Forced-choice Likert 
Likert        Forced-choice Likert       Forced-choice 
Forced-choice Likert        Interview     interview 
A time period of one week was interposed between the admin- 
istration of the interview and the two objective instruments. 
A verbal introduction of the interview described the 
nature of the interview and what was expected of the inter- 
viewee.  Emphasis was given to the fact that there were no 
right or wrong answers. Care was also taken to avoid the 
use of terminology such as "moral" or "moral judgment." 
The interviewer read aloud each dilemma situation and allowed 
the subject to read along on his copy of the dilemma situa- 
tion. Time was allowed for the subject to reread the situa- 
tion.  Questions were asked in exactly the same manner as 
they appeared in the interview manual and additional probe 
questions were asked when necessary.  The questions pertain- 
ing to the issue of keeping promises were not included in 
the interview to avoid any influence of the objective instru- 
ments.  The sequence in which the dilemma situations was 
presented was changed randomly for each subject.  All the 
interviews were administered individually and were recorded. 
Both age groups took approximately 30 minutes to complete 
the interview.  Subjects were instructed not to discuss the 
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interview with anyone until the conclusion of the experi- 
mental sessions. 
Subjects took the objective instruments either one week 
prior to the administration of the interview or one week 
after the interview, depending upon the experimental group 
in which they were placed. Directions for each questionnaire 
were read by the researcher who also answered any questions 
about the questionnaire. The amount of time necessary for 
the completion of both instruments varied a great deal. Ave- 
rage time needed for the college group was 15-20 minutes with 
seventh graders taking a little longer. Subjects were asked 
not to discuss the questionnaires with anyone until the com- 
pletion of all experimental sessions. 
All instruments were administered by the researcher for 
the college sample. An assistant administered the instru- 
ments to half of the seventh grade sample. Counterbalancing 
was done to offset any experimenter bias with the seventh 
grade sample in the following manner: 
Researcher I Researcher II 
Al' A3' A6' B2* B4' B6 
A2, A5. A4, B1# B 3' B5 
C,. C. Cc, P., D3, D5 C2. C4. C6. D2. D4, D6 1' w3* w5' 
Note. Letters designate experimental group and subscripts 
designate the subject in each group. 
As is indicated in the above table, six subjects were actu- 
ally included in each of the four experimental groups, however, 
absences from school resulted in only five of each group 
completing the entire experiment. 
Testing of the seventh grade sample took place in two 
rooms of the school building during the regular hours of the 
school day.  Testing was completed on two days one week apart. 
Testing of the college group took place in a conference room 
on the university campus.  The first half of the testing took 
place over a period of three days and was completed a week 
later at the same times. 
Description of the Sample 
A sample of 20 seventh graders and 21 college students 
were included in the study. The seventh grade sample 
attended a public elementary school located in a small 
southern town.  The sample was randomly selected from a 
non-random sample of all students enrolled in the seventh 
grade whose reading achievement level, as ascertained by the 
California Achievement Tests, was at grade level or above. 
Students in the seventh grade were divided into class sec- 
tions according to achievement level, therefore those stu- 
dents selected for the study were from the most advanced 
sections of the seventh grade.  The reading level limitation 
was imposed to insure the ability of all subjects to read 
the test and to furnish some control on the reading level 
variable. The sample ranged in age from 12-13.  All of the 
sample was Caucasian and included both males and females. 
The college sample was undergraduate students (predomi- 
nantly juniors and seniors) enrolled in a family relations 
course at a state-supported university located in a small 
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southern city.  The subjects were Caucasian and were predom- 
inantly female. 
Development of the Instruments 
The first step taken by the researcher was a revision 
of the objective instrument designed by Schwarz (1974) to 
include two alternate statements at each of the six moral 
stages.  Subjects continued to select higher stage state- 
ments similar to the Schwarz study (1974). 
With the objective of eliminating the subjects' tendency 
to select "best"-sounding statements, an objective instru- 
ment with a forced-choice format was devised.  Thirteen 
items representing paired comparisons of stages 3 and 4 and 
thirteen items representing paired comparisons of stages 4 
and 5 were included . Statements representing prototypical 
responses at each stage were taken from examples in the Kohl- 
berg Standard Scoring Manual (1975).  All items on the test 
dealt with one issue of moral judgment—promises.  The ques- 
tion, "Why should promises be kept?" was selected because it 
was not necessary to link the question to a specific dilemma 
situation.  In addition, the question was not of the kind 
that required both negative and positive responses.  Thus 
all paired statements represented a variety of reasons for 
why promises should be kept.  Subjects were instructed to 
select the responses most characteristic of a response that 
they would give.  Pilot groups were three non-random samples 
including nine 10-year-olds, 39 undergraduates, and 20 
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graduate students.  Age differences in stage preferences for 
statements on the pilot test gave a good indication that a 
response set had been eliminated.  All 10-year-olds over- 
whelmingly selected stage 3 responses as opposed to stage 4 
responses (a mean of 10.5 statements out of a possible 13 
selected).  Undergraduates generally selected more stage 4 
responses (a mean of 8 out of 13 possible) as opposed to 
stage 3 and more stage 4 responses (a mean of 7 out of 
13 statements) as opposed to stage 5.  Graduate students 
selected the stage 5 statements (a mean of 8 out of 13 state- 
ments) as opposed to stage 4 statements to a greater degree 
than the undergraduate group.  The graduate students' 
comments and suggestions were used in the revision of the 
test.  Revisions were made by rewording statements and 
eliminating items not distinguishing between groups. 
The revised test was administered to a non-randoin group 
of 35 undergraduate students.  The 35 subjects also completed 
a written interview adapted from three of the dilemma situa- 
tions in the Kohlberg interview (1975).  The forced-choice 
format considerably reduced—although not completely—the 
tendency for subjects to select a higher stage of reasoning 
than the subjects' own stage of usage.  Of 11 subjects who 
took the entire forced-choice instrument and were inter- 
viewed to ascertain actual stage, eight subjects scored the 
same stage on both the interview and the objective measure. 
in an effort to reduce the length of the instrument and 
further eliminate a response set. a LiXert scale using the 
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same statements from the paired comparison instrument was 
devised.  Six statements for each stage excluding stages 1 
and 6 were randomly combined for a total of 24 items.  The 
response scale allowed five alternatives for each statement 
which indicated the degree to which the statement was char- 
acteristic of the subject or most like a response he would 
give. The possible alternatives were these:  (a) strongly 
characteristic, (b) characteristic, (c) undecided, (d) not 
characteristic, (e) strongly not characteristic.  Thirty-nine 
undergraduates were administered both the Likert and the 
paired-comparison instruments.  Scores for the college group 
were similar on both instruments.  A pilot group of 25 sev- 
enth graders were also administered the Likert instrument. 
A comparison of the college and seventh grade groups indicated 
that college subjects preferred the statements in the follow- 
ing order of highest to lowest:  stage 3, stage 4, stage 5, 
and stage 2.  The seventh grade sample preferred the state- 
ments in this order:  stage 3, stage 2, stage 4, stage 5. 
A second and final form of the forced-choice instrument 
(see Appendix B) was devised using the following combina- 
tions of stages in statements:  2-3, 2-4, 2-5, 3-4, 3-5, and 
4-5.  Three sets of statements representing each possible 
combination were randomly combined for a total of 18 items. 
The forced-choice instrument was administered to 31 under- 
graduates who had previously taken the Likert form.  A com- 
parison of the stage scores for the two instruments, Likert 
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and forced-choice, indicated similarity in stage scores. 
Differences most often involved stages 3 and 4. 
Both Likert and forced-choice instruments were used in 
the study in order to determine the instrument correlating 
most highly with the Kohlberg Moral Judgment Interview 
(1975). 
The final form of the Likert instrument (see Appen- 
dix A) consisted of six statements for each stage (2, 3, 4, 
and 5) randomly combined for a total of 24 items. Students 
were instructed to circle the letter which indicated the 
degree to which the statement was characteristic of them or 
most like a response they would give. For statements that 
were not understood, the students were instructed to draw 
through all the letters. 
Stages 1 and 6 were not included in the final version 
of the instrument.  Current thinking is that fully function- 
ing stage 6 is very rarely reached and that attainment of 
stage 6 is a development of the adult years (Kohlberg & 
Turiel, 1973).  Therefore moral educators would not be con- 
cerned with ascertaining students' thinking at stage 6. 
Stage 6 is so rarely found that it is not included in the 
most recently revised scoring guide for the Kohlberg inter- 
view (1975).  Assessment of stage 1 was not considered impor- 
tant for purposes of moral education since most children 
progress through this stage easily without need of special 
educational efforts. According to age trends reported in 
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the literature, adolescents generally move from preconven- 
tional thinking to conventional thinking between the ages of 
10-13 (Kohlberg & Turiel, 1971).  By age 16, middle class 
urban boys were found to be predominantly stage 3 (Kohlberg 
& Turiel, 1971).  It was assumed that educators would be 
most concerned with raising seventh grade moral reasoning 
from stage 2 to stage 3 rather than from stage 1 to stage 2. 
Scoring of the Likert Instrument 
Scoring of the Likert instrument followed this proced- 
ure: 
1. Points were awarded on the basis of the letter 
selected for each statement. Five points were awarded for 
SC—strongly characteristic: four points were awarded for 
C—characteristic; three points were awarded for U—undecided; 
two points were awarded for N—not characteristic; one point 
was awarded for SN—strongly not characteristic: and zero 
points for statements whose letters were crossed out.  The 
stronger the degree of preference for a statement the higher 
the number of points awarded. 
2. Points for each statement were added to the points 
of the other statements representing the same stage.  Each 
stage received six scores which were added for a total score 
for each stage.  A total of 30 points was the highest pos- 
sible score for any one stage. 
3. The stage having the highest number of points was 
designated the dominant stage. For example, one subject's 
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score of points 28-25-23-19 would •*• described as having a 
dominate stage 2.  In the case of tied scores a transition 
stage was designated (e.g. a score of 25-25-24-18 was scored 
2-3). 
Scoring of the Forced-choice Instrument 
Scoring of the forced-choice instrument followed this 
procedure: 
1. The number of times a stage was selected over 
another stage was counted. 
2. A tally for each stage was made.  One subject's 
score of at?qf—I I  * f would indicate that the subject points 4—/—4—i 
selected stage 2 statements four times over other stage 
statements, selected stage 3 statements seven times, selected 
stage 4 statements four times, and selected stage 5 state- 
ments three times over statements of another stage. 
3. The stage receiving the highest number of points 
was designated the dominant stage on the questionnaire.  All 
subjects received 18 points; one point for each item.  The 
highest possible score, 0-3-6-9 would indicate that the sub- 
ject selected the higher stage in all combinations.  All 
scores for each stage were dependent upon the other.  If a 
subject selected a stage 3 statement over a stage 2 state- 
ment, an addition of one point to the stage 3 column and zero 
points to the stage 2 column would result. 
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Scoring of the Interview 
The scoring procedure for the interview (see Appen- 
dix C) and the format of the interview itself has undergone 
a series of revisions since its first use by Kohlberg in 
1958. The present scoring procedure is only considered an 
interim version.  A brief description of the development of 
the interview and the scoring procedure will give the reader 
some perspective in which to view the present scoring method. 
The 1958 interview consisted of nine moral dilemmas and 
took approximately 2 hours to administer. Kohlberg devised 
two methods of scoring the interview.  The first was a sen- 
tence scoring method in which the basic unit of analysis was 
the sentence.  Sentences were scored according to 25 defined 
aspects of moral judgment.  Stage typical sentences repre- 
senting aspects in the moral dilemmas comprised the guide for 
scoring.  The following is an aspect of moral judgment at 
stage 3 for the Heinz dilemma: 
Rules 
Aspect 22—Reaction of Authority 
Exaggerated sympathy for authority, says 
authority will allow Heinz to get drug 
legally.  (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 82) 
Scores for sentences across all stories were converted to 
stage percentages. 
The story rating method used the same nine stories, 
but used the story rather than the sentence as the unit of 
analysis.  Scores for all stories were converted to 
52 
percentages and a global score for the entire interview was 
determined. The model for scoring was stage-typical orien- 
tations to the story rather than stage-typical sentences as 
in the first method. 
In 1972 a structural issue rating method reflecting 
advances in moral developmental theory was devised.  The 
unit of analysis was an "issue" defined by Kohlberg as the 
"general thing being solved, judged, or reasoned about in 
the particular dilemma" (Kohlberg, 1975, p. 11). There were 
generally 5-10 issue scores depending upon the stories used 
in the interview and the use of issues by the subject.  Scores 
for each issue were converted to percentages and a global 
score across issues obtained.  A structural description of 
stage orientation on the issues was used as a model for 
scoring. 
In 1974 the standardized issue scoring method was 
devised.  This is the most recent scoring procedure and the 
method used in the present study.  The mimeographed scoring 
manual (1975) has been expanded to include five parts total- 
ing approximately 500 pages of material.  Consequently, only 
an overview of the procedure will be attempted here.  Basic 
advancements over the structural issue rating method will be 
described and a step-by-step procedure for scoring by the 
standardized scoring method will follow. 
While the structural interview with its emphasis on 
freely initiated probes is still the best method for inter- 
viewing higher stage subjects who must be probed more 
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thoroughly to articulate their complex ideas, it ia a very 
difficult interview to score. For this reason, a standar- 
dized scoring version of the structural format was devised. 
Standardized forms of the interview were devised by dividing 
the interview into two forms, A and B, with three stories in 
each form and two issues defined for each story. The two 
forms contained parallel stories each of which dealt with 
the same issues so that only one form was necessary to assess 
moral stage. The standard interview format is considered 
semi-structured.  The same questions are asked to each sub- 
ject and probes are intiated only to clarify or elaborate 
ideas expressed by the subject. 
The unit of analysis is again the issue, however, the 
orientation is to each point elaborated about the issue on 
a single story rather than to the subject's entire discuss- 
ion of an issue over several stories (structural issut* rat- 
ing method). Six issue scores are derived (two per story) 
for the entire interview and a form score computed by convert- 
ing points for all issues to percentages.  As was stated 
previously, only five issues were scored in the present 
study. 
Certain concepts called "criterion concepts" which best 
depict perspective and role-taking of each stage are pre- 
sented in the scoring manual along with the descriptions of 
structural orientation by stage for each issue. The basic 
procedure in standard scoring is to match reasoning in the 
protocol with the "criterion concepts" in the manual. For 
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example, one of the criterion concepts listed under stage 3 
in the Heinz story is as follows: 
A.l It is right to steal the drug because the husband 
is doing it out of love or the good intentions of 
saving a life, his wife's life, etc., and this is 
his only choice in a life and death situation. 
(Kohlberg, 1975, Manual A, p. 16) 
The above criterion concept typifies a personal, affective 
level of perspective.  In standard scoring any reasoning 
which makes this point for a justification for stealing the 
drug would be scored 1 point at stage 3 on the Life issue. 
The procedure set forth in the scoring manual was adhered to 
as closely as possible in the scoring of the protocols of 
the present study. 
The following is a description of the procedure used in 
scoring the protocols: 
1. The subject's entire response on one issue was read. 
2. The scorer then matched criterion points listed in 
the manual with points of reasoning given in the protocol. 
For each distinct stage idea elaborated by the subject one 
point was entered at that stage on the scoring sheet.  For 
example, an idea which fits a stage 2 criterion concept for 
the issue of punishment will be scored as 1 point at stage 2. 
If the subject made the same point twice even in response 
to different questions it was still counted only once.  On 
the other hand, if the subject made 2 or more distinct points 
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in response to a single question all points were counted at 
their appropriate stages. A response idea was scored only 
when it corresponded to a point in the manual.  Thus, some 
points made by the subject were left unscored. 
3. The goal of standard scoring was to find those 
places in a subject's discussion of an issue where he gave 
two solid pieces of reasoning at a particular stage. When 
the necessary evidence for one stage was found, reasoning at 
the next higher stage was investigated. 
4. For a given issue, no more than 2 points for each 
stage were scored, however, oftentimes only 1 point for a 
stage was found. 
5. Ambiguous points were given when 2 specific points 
could not be found.  Ambiguous points (e.g. 3-Aj ambiguous 
stage 3) indicated that the response was basically at a 
given stage but which contained some elements of a lower 
stage. 
6. Scoring of the issue ended when no reasoning at the 
next higher stage could be found. 
7. After all issues were scored individual issue scores 
as well as an overall score was determined. 
Issue scores were determined by looking at all the 
points awarded for the given issue.  If only one stage 
received points then a pure stage score was given the sub- 
ject.  If more than one stage was used the stage that received 
the roost number of points was designated the major stage for 
the issue,  in cases where only two stages were used the 
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remaining stage was considered the minor stage and was 
enclosed  in parentheses e.g.,   3(2).     If the two stages 
received an equal number of points they were both consid- 
ered major  stages and were written with a hyphen between 
them,   e.g.,   2-3.     To clarify the assignment of  issue scores 
all possible combinations of scores that could have been 
obtained from protocols that use only two scores is listed: 
Patterns of Issue Scores 
2i 1.1 ,
311,1 i s  scored 2-3 
2| 1.1 
3| 1       is   scored 2(3) 
211,1 
3' A,A is  scored 2(3) 
% A.l  is   scored 3(2) 
211 
3] A, A is   scored 2-3 
H 31 A is   scored 3 
31 1 is   scored 3 
211.1 
31 A.l  is  scored 2(3) 
(Kohlberg,   1975.   p.   8) 
Finding the use of three stages on  individual   issues was not 
common.     In such cases all stages receiving only 1 or h 
points were eliminated.     Then the   issue was  scored in the 
same manner as  the  two-stage protocols.     For example,   with 
a score of 2 
3 
1,1 the first step was to eliminate stages 1 
1 
and  3   since  each only received 1 point.     Stage  2   is the 
only remaining  stage;   the   issue  is  scored stage  2. 
After having completed all five issues an overall score 
was calculated.    The basic purpose was to determine if the 
protocol was a pure stage or a mixture of two stages or in 
rare cases three stages.    The percentage of usage by stage was 
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determined by adding up the total number of points over 
all issues for each stage.  Protocols where 76% or more of 
the total number of points awarded were at the same stage 
were judged to be purely at that stage.  Stages representing 
less than 25% of the total were treated as non-existent, 
even in mixed scores.  The stages receiving less than 76% 
but more than 25% of the total points were designated the 
major or minor stage, e.g. yl 60% would be scored 3(2). 
Stages receiving 50% of the total points were designated 
major stages, e.g., 2-3. 
In the analysis of the data form scores were used in 
the computation of mean stage and for the correlation coef- 
ficients.  The number of points received for each stage 
across issues was used for the'stage by stage analysis of 
the data.  Issue scores were used for the computation of 
inter-rater reliability. 
Excerpts from protocol #31 are presented to illustrate 
how a protocol was scored on the Life issue (taken from the 
Heinz dilemma): 
Q.  Is there a good reason for a husband to steal if he 
doesn't love his wife? 
I think yes, because he would be saving a life. 
Q. Would it be as right to steal it for a stranger as 
for his wife? 
No. 
Q.  Why? 
Well, I think he would be less likely to steal for 
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a stranger aa for hia wife.     It would still be as 
legitimate to steal for a stranger to save his life, 
but he would be more likely to steal  for his wife, 
even if he didn't love her,   than for a stranger. 
The above protocol  is a clear example of stage 3 reasoning 
which matches criterion concept B-9  in the scoring manual. 
The criterion concept  is stated as follows: 
B 9.     It would be right to steal  for a stranger,  but 
he would feel less obligation or motivation to 
do so.     (Obligation and affection are somewhat 
confused).     Kohlberg,   1975, p.  23) 
In this particular case only one clear point for the 
Life issue was elaborated.    The protocol was scored stage  3 
for the issue of life. 
As is pointed out in the scoring manual there will often 
be as much as  50% of an interview that is unscorable.    Unscor- 
able responses  are primarily of two types.    One is where a 
subject does not provide enough information or faila to 
answer the  "why" of a question.     Such is the case in the 
following excerpt from protocol #31: 
Q.    Which  is worse letting someone die or stealing? 
Letting someone die. 
Q.     Why? 
Letting someone die would be worse than stealing. 
Further probes  did not elicit any additional  information. 
A second type of response that is considered unscorable are 
responses that do not discriminate between stages.    Such 
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responses are given as frequently at one stage as at another. 
For example the following responses appear with equal fre- 
quency on stage 2 and stage 3 protocols: 
Q.  What is the most important thing a good father 
should recognize in his relation to his son? 
Trust. A father should learn to trust his son and 
to be honest with him.  (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 19) 
While the issue of trust is clearly addressed, it is not 
clear whether a stage 2 or stage 3 perspective is intended. 
Either trust for the sake of relationship (stage 3) or trust 
for the benefit of oneself (stage 2) could have been the 
imi plication.     The important task of scoring is to recognize 
and match scorable responses with criterion concepts pre- 
sented in the manual. 
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CHAPTER   IV 
ANALYSIS OP THE  DATA 
The primary objective of the study was to develop a 
valid and reliable objective measure of preference for 
moral stage which would approximate the Kohlberg Moral 
Judgment  Interview in stage scores. 
Two objective  instruments were designed;  one a paired 
comparison instrument pitting paired stages 2,  3.   4,  and 5 
statements against each other and a Likert instrument which 
elicited one of five degrees of preference for statements 
representing stages  2,  3.  4,  and 5.    The Kohlberg Moral Judg- 
ment  Interview,   form A,   (1975),  was administered to all sub- 
jects to validate the objective instruments.    Subjects were 
21 undergraduate students and 20 seventh grade students. 
The following hypotheses were proposed for each of the 
three instruments: 
1. College subjects show significantly higher scores 
on stages  3 and 4 than on stages 2 and 5. 
2. seventh grade subjects show significantly higher 
scores on stages  2  and 3 than on stages 4 and 5. 
3. College subjects have a significantly higher moral 
stage preference than seventh grade subjects. 
Inter-rater reliability for the interview responses 
isented first,   followed by the analysis of the will pr« 
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data  from the  interview,   the analysis of the data  from the 
Likert instrument,   and the analysis of the data from the 
forced-choice instrument.    Reliability of the objective 
instruments will  then be presented followed by a final 
section presenting an analysis of the validity of the objec- 
tive instruments. 
Inter-rater Reliability for the Interview Responses 
Three tests for scorer reliability were obtained. For 
all three tests the form scores of the two raters were com- 
pared  for  extent of  agreement. 
The first was obtained by having a scorer from Kohlberg's 
staff  (who had been trained by and who had worked closely 
with Kohlberg)  to score blindly 10 randomly selected proto- 
cols including five college and five seventh grade inter- 
views.    The reliability coefficient between the present 
researcher's  scores  and the Kohlberg scorer's scores was 
.78.     (This  and all  future  reports of correlation coeffic- 
ients were computed as  Pearson   Product Moment  values.) 
Actual   scores on the protocols differed on three comparisons 
(researcher  stage 4 vs.   scorer stage  3(4);  stage 2 vs. 
stage  2-3;   and stage   3(2)   vs.   stage   2(3)).      (See Chapter  III 
for a complete description of scoring.)    The Kohlberg scorer 
noted that on two of the discrepant  interviews,   statements 
were at least a certain stage,  but  if more fully developed 
responses had been given,   the subject could have been scored 
a higher stage for certain issues.     The researcher,  however. 
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gave the "benefit of the doubt" when statements indicated a 
more structurally advanced state; hence, the two interviews 
were scored at  slightly higher stages. 
The researcher aleo scored 10 interviews  secured from 
the Kohlberg staff and correlated these scores with the 
scores given by the Kohlberg staff.    These protocols were 
generally not as lengthy as the protocols from the present 
study, however,   the format used for both groups of protocols 
was form A of the Kohlberg Moral Judgment  Interview  (1975). 
Inter-rater  reliability was   .97 which indicated a  strong 
degree of consensus with the Kohlberg staff on scoring. 
Three  independent  scorers were trained by the researcher 
for the purposes of obtaining a third reliability score. 
This third score would indicate the adequacy of a minimal 
amount of scorer training.  Scorers met with the researcher for 
approximately four hours  in two  sessions.     In addition,   the 
scorers read selected parts of the scoring manual and famil- 
iarized themselves with the scoring guide.    Ten interviews 
not  included  in   the  study were  scored by each of the scorers 
during the practice period.     The protocols were divided  into 
three groups according to moral  judgment situation.    Due to 
the length of the protocols and the time-consuming scoring 
procedure,   it was decided that each scorer would score only 
one of the dilemma situations for all 41 protocols.    Scorer 1 
scored blindly all the protocols for situation 1.   scorer  2 
scored blindly all the protocols for situation 2.   and scorer 3 
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scored blindly all protocols  for situation 3.    Reliability 
coefficients were obtained by correlating the stage score 
given for each issue with the score given by the researcher 
for each issue. 
Reliability coefficients for the five moral  issues scored 
by the three scorers and the researcher were as follows: 
.40,   .37,   .45,   .41,   and   .36.     These results tend to support 
Kohlberg's contention that learning to score is learning the 
theory.     It takes several months of practice to become a 
proficient scorer. 
Reaults of  the   Interview 
The protocols were scored by assigning a stage of 1,  2, 
3,  4,   or 5,   or a mixed stage score  (e.g.  4(5),   2-3)  for each 
of the five moral  issues discussed during the interview  (see 
Chapter III  for a complete description of scoring).    Thus 
each protocol received five issue scores   (e.g.   3,   2-3,   2,   3, 
and 3).    These issue scores were converted to points per stage 
for all  issues.     In order to insure the equal contribution 
of each issue to the total tally,  each issue was counted as 
3 points.     Therefore all subjects had a total of 15 points 
distributed among the stages.    A protocol with the following 
five issue scores:     3.   2-3.   2.   3.  and 3 was converted to 10.5 
points at stage 3  and 4.5 points at stage 2  (an issue score 
of 2-3 was  interpreted as 1.5 points for both stage 2 and 
stage 3).    The number of points received for each stage was 
used for the stage by stage analysis of the data. 
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The data were analyzed with t tests to determine salient 
differences between responses for each stage.    An analysis 
of variance could not be used due to the unequal distribution 
of interview scores.    The seventh grade subjects yielded no 
stage 4 or  stage 5 points and college subjects yielded no 
stage 1 or  stage  5 points.    Thus,  variability could not be 
measured on stages lacking scores. 
It was hypothesized that college  subjects would score 
significantly more points on stages 3 and 4 than on stages 
2 and 5,   and that  seventh grade subjects would score signif- 
icantly higher on stages 2 and 3 than on stages 4 and 5. 
The t-tests reported in Table 1 indicated that statistically 
significant  differences existed between the stages with the 
exception  of stage   2  vs.   4 on the college sample.     The non- 
significance of  the college  2  vs.   4 comparison can be ex- 
plained by   the  fact  that the greatest percentage of points 
on the  interview  for college subjects was 66% at  stage  3 
with stages  2 and 4 receiving 12% and 22% respectively of the 
total response as  shown in Figure 1.     In similar fashion, 
seventh grade subjects  scored the largest percentage of 
responses at  stage 2.    However,   differences between the means 
of the two adjacent  stages   (stages 1 and 3) were significant 
(£ <.05).     It appears that college subjects did score signif- 
icantly higher on stages 3 and 4 than on stages 2 and 5. 
Stages  3 and 4 received 88% of the total response on the 
interview,  while stages  2 and 5 received 12% of the total 
response.     This evidence serves to support the  first hypothesis. 
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Table 1 
t-tests for Differences between the Means of each Stage 
on the Interview for College and Seventh Grade Subjects 
Group Comparisons t 
College stage 2 vs. 3 9.33** 
stage 3 vs. 4 7.24** 
stage 2 vs. 4 1.66 n.s. 
Seventh grade stage 1 vs. 2 6.53** 
stage 2 vs. 3 4.61** 
stage 1 vs. 3 2.32*   
* £ <.05. 
»* £  <.01. 
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Figure 1.     Percentage of total response for each 
stage on the interview for college and 
seventh grade subjects. 
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There is  also adequate evidence to retain the hypothesis 
that seventh grade subjects score significantly more points 
on stages 2  and 3 than on stages 4 and 5.    Stages 4 and 5 
received no points  for seventh grade subjects while sta- 
ges 2 and 3 received 86% of the total response on the  inter- 
view. 
Seventh grade  response on stage 1 was 14% of the total 
interview points.     Had this high a percentage been antici- 
pated,   a more  satisfactory analysis of the data could have 
been made  if  stage   1  had been added to the Likert   and forced 
choice instruments.     In comparing the instruments  stage 1 
was eliminated  from the analysis since there was no compar- 
able score on the Likert and forced-choice instruments. 
It was hypothesized that college subjects have a signif- 
icantly higher moral  stage preference than seventh grade 
subjects.    Mean stage scores for the two groups were col- 
lege,  3.33:   and seventh grade,   2.23.    The mean stage score 
was determined from each subject's overall form score.     These 
stage levels  appear consistent with moral developmental 
theory in that  the invariant and sequential nature of moral 
stage is reflected. 
A 2 x 2 repeated measures analysis of variance was used 
to determine significant differences between college and 
seventh grade subjects on stages 2 and 3  (see Table 2).    A 
significant interaction effect as well as a significant 
effect for Stage was  found.    The total number of points 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Variance for Stages 2 and 3 on Interview 
Source of Variation df MS F 
Between  qroupa 
1 6.8571 1.8113 n.s. A  (age) 
Subjects within groups 40 3.7857 
Within sub-jects 
1 66.9643 5.0213* B  (stage) 
AB 1 817.1905 61.2766** 
Bx subjects within groups 42 13.3361 
*£<.05. 
**£ <.01. 
Newman-Keuls Tests of Differences Between Means for Stages 2 
and 3 in the College and Seventh Grade Samples. 
«2 
7X3 7X2 cx3 
CX2 -  2.8095 — 2.3572 6.8095* 8.0238* 
753 -  5.1667 - - 4.4523* 5.6666* 
7X2 « 9.6190 - - - 1.2143 
CX3 - 10.8333 - - - - 
Note. C - college sang>le, 7 - seventh grade sample, sub- 
scripts denote stage. 
*2 <.01. 
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received on the  interview was held constant for all subjects 
so that there was no effect for Age.    A Newman-Keula  test 
(Kirk,   1968)   indicated that the difference between college 
stage  3 and seventh grade  stage  3 was  significant   (p. <.01) 
as were the  differences between stage  2 means   (see Table 2). 
Hypothesis  3 can be accepted in view of the significant 
difference between mean stages of the two groups. 
Results of  the  Likert   Instrument 
The Likert  data were  analyzed  in the  form of points 
awarded on the  basis  of the degree  of preference  for each 
of the 24 statements.    The stronger the degree of preference 
the higher the number of points awarded.     Points for each 
statement were  added to the points of the other  statements 
representing  the  same  stage.     A total of  30 points was  the 
highest possible score for any one stage. 
The data were analyzed using procedures of analysis of 
variance and a Newraan-Keuls test to determine significant 
differences  between responses   for each stage.     A 2  x 4 analy- 
sis of variance  with repeated measures was performed to 
determine significant mean  differences  for responses by 
stage.     A significant  difference was  indicated for Stage and 
for the   interaction of Age x Stage   (see Table  3).     A Newman- 
Keuls  test   (Kirk.   1968),   a multiple comparison test,  was used 
to determine significant differences between the means  for 
each group of  subjects   (see Table  3). 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Variance for Likert Instrument 
Source of variation df MS F 
Between groups 
1 79.8062 2.8037n.s. A (age) 
Subjects within groups 38 28.4655 
Within subjects 
3 215.2729 15.7768* B (stage) 
AB 3 55.9230 4.0982* 
Bx subjects within 80 13.6458 
groups 
*£   <.01. 
Newman-Keuls Tests of Differences Between Means for Likert 
Instrument-College Subjects 
*2 X5 X4 X3 
X2 *  17.50 - 2.45 6.10* 6.15* 
X5 - 19.95 - - 3.65* 3.70* 
X4 =  23.60 - - - .05 
X3 =  23.65 - - - - 
*£   <.01. 
Newman-Keuls Tests  of Differences  Between Means  for  Likert 
Instrument-Seventh Subjects 
*E <.01. 
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It was hypothesized that the college subjects would 
score significantly higher on stages 3 and 4 than on stages 
2 and 5.  For the college group significant differences were 
found for four of the six comparisons (X_ vs. X. =■ 6.10*. 
X2 vs. X3 - 6.15*. X5 vs. X4 - 3.65*. X5 vs. X3 - 3.70*; 
p /.01).  The difference between means for X- vs. X,- and 
for X. vs. X, was not significant. Means for stages 2 and 5 
were the lowest of the four stages with means for stages 3 
and 4 being the highest.  In view of the evidence that the 
college subjects did score significantly higher on stages 3 
and 4 than on stages 2 and 5, the hypothesis can be retained. 
It was hypothesized that the seventh grade subjects 
would show significantly higher scores on stages 2 and 3 
than on stages 4 and 5. For the seventh grade subjects only 
one significant difference was found on the Newman-Keuls 
test.  The means of stages 5 and 3 differed significantly 
(£ (.01).  The results of the analyses shown in Table 3 
indicate that the Likert instrument did not differentiate 
responses on the other stage comparisons. The data for the 
Likert instrument do not lend support for the second hypoth- 
esis. 
It was hypothesized that the college subjects would 
score significantly higher than the seventh grade subjects. 
The means for each stage for both college and seventh grade 
groups on the Likert instrument are presented in Figure 2. 
A Newman-Keuls test was used to determine mean differences 
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Stage 
Figure 2. Means for Likert instrument by stage for 
seventh grade and college subjects. 
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between the college and seventh grade groups.     A significant 
difference   (E ^.01)   between the means of  seventh grade and 
college groups at stage 2 was  found but differences between 
stages  3,   4,   and  5 were  not  significant   (see Table 4).     The 
third hypothesis  cannot  be accepted since  the  Likert  instru- 
ment did not distinguish means between the higher stages for 
the two groups.     This  is more clearly seen by looking at the 
mean stage scores  for the two groups.    The college subjects' 
average score was   3.62 while  the seventh grade mean was 
3.25.     Mean  stage  scores were calculated  from each subject's 
overall dominant score. 
Seventh  grade  subjects appeared to have preferred 
stage  5 statements   as  being most characteristic  of themselves 
to a greater  degree than  the college subjects.     This could 
have been due  to  the tendency of seventh graders  to mark 
statements   they did not understand with an  "undecided"  or 
"strongly characteristic"   rather than to cross  the statement 
out  as the directions  stated.     While  it  is  believed that 
stage   2 subjects  theoretically cannot  truly comprehend reas- 
oning at stage   5,   only 8 out of 20 subjects crossed out at 
least  one stage   5   statement.     Only one subject crossed out 
as many as three of the possible six statements representing 
reasoning at stage  5.     In contrast.   24 out of 25 seventh 
graders in a pilot group crossed out at least one stage 5 
statement.     However,   only 5 of the 24 subjects crossed out 
at least three stage 5 statements.    The major difference 
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Table 4 
Newman-Keuls Tests of Differences  Between Means on the Likert 
Instrument for College and Seventh Grade Subjects 
CX2 = 17.50 
CX5 = 19.95 
7X5 = 20.25 
7X2 = 22.05 
7X4 - 22.65 
|CX4 - 23.60 
bx3 - 23.65 
7X3 - 25.40 
*£ <.01. 
cx2   cx5 7Xe 7X, 7x4     cx4     cx3 7X. 
2.45     2.75    4.55*  5.15* 6.10* 6.15* 7.90* 
.30    2.10    2.70    3.65 3.70 5.45* 
1.80    2.40    3.35 3.40 5.15* 
.60    1.55 1.60 3.35 
.95 1.00 2.75 
• .05 1.80 
_ - 1.75 
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between the pilot  and the experimental groups was that the 
pilot group represented a cross section of seventh graders 
in terms of reading achievement scores while the experimental 
group was randomly chosen from those subjects reading at 
grade level.    The greater frequency of crossed out statements 
for the pilot group may have resulted from a confounding of 
reading comprehension level with moral stage comprehension. 
The general  low frequency of crossing out stage  5 statements 
in both groups may be due to certain test  taking behaviors 
of the seventh grade age group or to possible efforts to 
understand stage  5   statements in terms of  a lower  stage 
structure.     Further research is needed to clarify the issue. 
The Likert  instrument was rescored by awarding zero 
points to  stage  5  statements marked as  "undecided."     The 
rationale   for rescoring was   the conjecture that  seventh 
grade subjects may have been confused between not understand- 
ing a statement  and being undecided about  it.   resulting in 
a higher  number of undecided responses.     If this was the case 
subjects would have  received more points for not understand- 
ing a statement  and marking   "undecided"  than for understand- 
ing the statement  and marking   "not characteristic."     Adjusted 
means for  stage  5 on the Likert instrument were 17.00 points 
for the college sample and 16.05 points for the seventh grade 
group out  of   a possible   30.00 points  for each score.     While 
the college mean was higher the difference was still not 
statistically significant.    Thus  it appeared unlikely that 
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the seventh graders were marking the  "undecided"  response  for 
stage  5 statements  that were not understood. 
Results of  the  Forced-choice  Instrument 
The data were analyzed by procedures of analysis  of 
variance and a  Newman-Keuls test  (Kirk,   1968)   to determine 
salient differences between responses  for each stage.     The 
data were analyzed in the  form of total points  awarded for 
each stage. 
A 2 x 4 analysis  of variance with repeated measures was 
performed to determine  significant mean differences for 
responses of the  seventh grade  and college groups.     The anal- 
yses presented  In Table  5  indicate that the effects of  Stage 
and the  interaction of  Stage x Age were  significant  at  the 
.01 and  .05  levels  respectively.    No effect for Age was  found 
since all  subjects  scored a constant  total number of points 
on the  instrument. 
It was hypothesized that the college subjects would 
score  significantly higher  on stages  3 and 4 than on stages 2 
and 5.     The  results  of  the Newman-Keuls  test for the college 
sample  are presented  in Table  5.     Significant differences 
were found between all  means except  stages  3 and 4.   (p >.05). 
Stages  3  and 4 were the highest means while  stages 2  and 5 
were the lowest.     Thus adequate support is given for the 
acceptance of  the  first hypothesis. 
It was hypothesized that seventh graders would score 
significantly higher on  stages  2  and 3  than on stages 4 and 5. 
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Table 5 
Analysis of Variance for Forced-choice Instrument 
Source of variation df MS P 
Between  subjects 
1 .0562 .9983n.s. A (age) 
Subjects within groups 38 .0563 
yithin subjects 
3 152.3729 38.1514** B (stage) 
AB 3 15.0396 3.7657* 
B x subjects within 
groups 
80 3.9939 
*o <.05. 
**£   {.01. 
Newman-Keuls Tests for Differences Between Means for 
Forced-choice Instrument College Sample 
*2 *5 X4 *3 
ic2 - 1.60 - 2.25* 4.25* 4.95* 
X5 -  3.85 - - 2.00* 2.70* 
K4 - 5.85 -    - - - .70 
ic3 - 6.55 - - - - 
*fi {.01. 
Newman-Keuls Tests for Differences Between Means for 
Forced-choice Instrument Seventh Grade Sample 
*p (.01. 
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The results of the Newman-Keuls test for the seventh grade 
sample indicated that significant differences were found for 
all but  two mean comparisons  (see Table 5).    Mean differences 
for stages  2  and 5 and for stages 3 and 4 were not signifi- 
cant  (p.  /.05).     Mean scores were highest for stages  3 and 4 
and lowest  for stages  2  and 5,  thus,   the hypothesis that 
seventh graders would score significantly higher on stages 2 
and 3 than on stages 4 and 5 cannot be supported. 
It was hypothesized that college subjects would score 
significantly higher than the seventh grade subjects.    The 
means by stage  for both the college and seventh grade groups 
on the forced-choice   instrument   are  shown  in Figure 3.     The 
similarity of the seventh grade and college curves indicates 
that the forced-choice  instrument-did not appear to disting- 
uish between scores  for the college and the seventh grade 
subjects.    A Hewman-Keuls test was used to determine signif- 
icant mean differences between the college and seventh grade 
groups   (see Table 6).    No significant differences between 
stage 2.   stage  3.   stage 4.  or stage 5 for the two groups was 
found.    Mean stage scores,  calculated from the subjects' 
overall dominant score on the forced-choice instrument were 
college.   3.45:   and seventh grade.   3.33.    The hypothesis that 
the college subjects would score significantly higher in terms 
of etage preference than the seventh grade subjects cannot 
be accepted. 
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Means  for  forced-choice instrument by 
stage for seventh grade and college subjects. 
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Table 6 
Newman-Keuls Tests for Differences Between Means on the 
Forced-choice Instrument for College and Seventh Grade Subjects 
cx2 7X5 7X2 cx5 7X4      CX4 7X3 cx3 
:x2 = 1.60 - 1.00 1.70 2.25* 4.00*  4.25* 4.90* 4.95* 
7X5 - 2.60 - - .70 1.25 3.00*  3.25* 3.90* 3.95* 
7X2 =  3.30 - - - .55 2.30*  2.55* 3.20* 3.25* 
:x5 = 3.85 - - - - 1.75*  2.00* 2.65* 2.70* 
7X4 = 5.60 - - - - .25 .90 .95 
;x4 = 5.85 - - - - . .65 .70 
7X3 = 6.50 - - - - .   J - .05 
:x3 = 6.55 - - - - —                      " • ■■ 
*E (.01. 
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Reliability of Objective Inatrumenta 
The reliability of the Likert and the forced-choice 
instruments was measured by the procedure of test-retest 
reliability.    Thirty-two college undergraduates were admin- 
istered the Likert test and were retested two weeks later 
under similar conditions.    A reliability coefficient of .75 
was obtained for the Likert instrument.    Reliability coef- 
ficients obtained for each stage were as follows:    stage 2, 
r-.75;   stage  3,   r-.77;   stage 4,   r-.81;   and stage  5,   r-.66. 
Two reliability coefficients were obtained for the 
forced-choice instrument.    A sample of 18 seventh graders 
was administered the  forced-choice instrument and was retested 
two weeks later.    The average correlation across stages 
was r-.31.     The  following correlation coefficients were 
obtained for each stage:     stage 2,  r».31:  stage 3,  r^.28; 
stage 4,   r».49;   and stage 5,  r».17. 
Twenty-three college undergraduates were administered 
identical  forms of the  forced-choice test one week apart. 
The following reliability coefficients were obtained: 
stage 2.   r-.26;   stage   3.   r-.63:   stage 4.   r-.66;   and stage  5. 
r-.74.    The low reliability coefficient for stage 2 is mis- 
leading since zero scores  for stage 2 were included in the 
computation.    The average reliability coefficient across 
stages was   .57. 
The low reliability of the forced-choice instrument 
for the seventh grade subjects can be accounted for.   in part. 
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by the inability of some subjects to read the  instrument. 
The teacher who administered the instrument noted that stu- 
dents often asked to have sentences or words read. 
Suggestive of the lower reliability of the forced-choice 
instrument was the frequent comment made by subjects that 
the forced-choice  instrument was more  "confusing"; meaning 
that it was difficult to select one response over another. 
Validation of Objective Instruments 
Table 7  summarizes the results obtained by correlating 
each objective instrument with the interview.    Coefficients 
for the first two columns were obtained separately for each 
age group by stage.    A combined correlation coefficient was 
obtained by combining age groups  for each stage.    A single 
correlation coefficient was obtained by combining both age 
groups and correlating the dominant stage score of the objec- 
tive instrument with the form score from the interview for 
each subject.     This overall coefficient was expected to be 
the most meaningful indicator of validity since  it compared 
a dominant stage score rather than points received for each 
stage.     For educational  purposes predominance of stage is 
most meaningful in assessing moral growth rather than fluctua- 
tions in points awarded to stages on the objective instru- 
ments. 
Although none of the reported correlations was high 
enough to consider either test instrument a valid test for 
the kinds of thinking presumably elicited in the interview. 
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Table 7 
Validity Coefficients  for all Instruments by Group 
"mm 
Colleae* Seventhb Combined Groups0 
L2I2d -.01 -.40 .30 
L3I3 .43 .27 .03 
L4I4 .23 - - 
L vs. I correlation 
stage ■ .41 
coefficient computed by dominant 
F2I2 .33 -.24 .42 
F3I3 .31 .01 .13 
F4I4 .25 - - 
F vs. I correlation coefficient computed by 
stage ■ .68 
dominant 
an - 21. 
ba - 20. 
cn - 41. 
\ - Likert instrument.   I - interview,   P 
instrument,   numerals denote stage. 
forced-choice 
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the results were encouraging.    The correlation coefficient 
for the interview and forced-choice instrument was   .68, 
but the correlation coefficient for the interview and the 
Likert instrument was  .41.    The greater tendency of the 
seventh grade group to score a higher predominant stage on 
the Likert than on the forced-choice measure may have 
resulted in the  lower correlation coefficient for the Likert 
vs.  the interview. 
It is of interest to note that on the Likert and forced- 
choice instruments  95% and 90%,respectively,  of the college 
subjects scored within one stage of that attained on the 
interview  (see Table 8).    The percentage of  seventh grade 
subjects scoring either the same stage,  a one-half stage 
higher or a full  stage higher was 75% on the Likert and 70% 
on the forced-choice measure.    The most striking comparisons 
were between the percentage of subjects scoring the identi- 
cal stage on the  interview and objective instrument,    while 
43% and 48% of the college subjects scored the same stage  (as 
the interview score)  on the Likert and forced-choice  instru- 
ments respectively,   only 20% of the seventh grade subjects 
scored the same stage on the Likert and only 10% of the 
seventh grade group scored the same stage on the forced- 
choice in comparison to the interview scores   (see Table 8). 
Comparison with Schwars   (1974) 
A comparison of the difference scores reported here with 
those reported by Schwarr  (1974. p.  85)  for a multiple choice 
, 
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Table 8 
Distribution of Difference Scores between Form Score on the 
Interview and the Dominant Stage on Forced-choice,   and 
Lifcert  Inatruments for College and Seventh Grade  
Likert Forced-Choice 
College College 
Degree of difference f % Degree of difference f % 
+1*5 stages 1 .05 +lh stages 1 05 
+1    stage 8 .38 +1 stage 6 28 
+Jj    stage 3 14 *j stage 3 14 
same stage 9 43 same stage 10 48 
-1 stage 1 05 
Seventh Grade Seventh Grade 
Degree of difference f % Degree of difference f * 
+3 stages 2 .10 
+2 stages 3 15 +2 stages 4 20 
+1 stage 6 30 +1H stages 2 10 
+h stage 5 25 4-1 stage 11 55 
same stage 4 20 +h stage 1 05 
same stage 2 10 
Note.    Degrees of difference indicate difference from the 
interview score. 
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instrument administered to a similar college sample indicated 
that some gains had been made in more closely approximating 
the interview scores.     Schwarz's difference score was obtained 
by subtracting the highest twice-attained scores on the open- 
end instrument from the dominant stage scores on the objec- 
tive test.    The highest twice-attained score would tend to 
be higher than the form score calculated in the present study 
which would result in larger difference scores for the present 
study.    Despite this discrepancy,  both the Likert and forced- 
choice instruments appeared to be more accurate instruments 
than the objective instrument first attempted in the Schwarz 
study (1974).    While 50* of the Schwarz college subjects 
scored at least two stages higher on the objective instru- 
ment than their twice highest reached stage on the open-end 
instrument,  only 5* of the college subjects in the present 
study scored one and a half stages higher than their score 
on the interview.    Eight percent of the college subjects in 
the Schwarz study made the same score on both instruments. 
The percentage of college subjects attaining the same score 
as the interview on the Likert and forced-choice instruments 
was 43% and 48* respectively. 
Comparison with Restf   Turiel,   and Kohlberq   (1969) 
in contrast to Rest,  Kohlberg.  and Turiel  (1969) who 
found that subjects preferred +1 and +2 statements to an 
equal degree,  the results of the present study indicate 
that not all  subjects preferred +1 and +2 statements to the 
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same degree.     Ninety  to ninety-five percent of the college 
subjects preferred either their own stage of usage or the 
next stage higher.       The Rest,  Turiel,  and Kohlberg  (1969) 
subjects were fifth and eighth graders and would be expected 
to compare more closely with the seventh graders of the 
present study.     Seventh grade subjects in this study showed 
a greater tendency to select +1 and +2 statements in similar 
fashion to Rest,  Turiel,   and Kohlberg's subjects.    None of 
the college  subjects  showed a predominant preference for 
+2 statements whereas  20 to 25* of the seventh graders pre- 
ferred a stage at least 2 stages higher than their own  (see 
Table 8).    This might  suggest a number of possible explana- 
tions;  one being a possible test-taking behavior peculiar to 
elementary and  junior high subjects.    Level of comprehension 
of higher stage  statements may explain the age difference for 
preference of moral stage.    The present study was not designed 
to ascertain comprehension of statements on the objective 
instruments . 
While the Rest,   Turiel.  and Kohlberg study  (1969)  data 
is inconclusive and is not directly comparable with the data 
presented here,   it does pose some interesting questions about 
the nature of preference and assimilation of moral structures. 
W difficulty in comparing the results xs  that Rest fit |1. 
(1969)  did not include the subjects'  own •"^"f^It      °* 
advice from which the  subjects «•*» their ch°^e °*0J°£de. 
advice.     Only in the case of stage 1 was an exception maae. 
stage 1  subjects were given their own stage of advice  in 
Place of -1 stage advice.     ™«« 8ub^" "^^ice. stage advice in preference for +1 and +2 stage advice. 
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Two alternative theories of preference and assimilation are 
suggested  (Rest,  Turiel,  & Kohlberg,   1969).     Piaget has pre- 
sented an equilibrium view of stage development  (Turiel, 
1969) which suggests  that an individual prefers and assimi- 
lates new material to his own equilibrated stage structure. 
An individual's next preference would be the +1 stage which 
he gradually would attempt to use.    This equilibrium theory 
does not fully explain preference and assimilation of state- 
ments made by others,  however,  the results of the college 
sample would tend to support this notion. 
A "Platonic  level" view  is supported by the Rest, 
Turiel,  Kohlberg  (1969)  findings.     The individual  is believed 
to possess an innate appreciation for more mature stages and, 
therefore,  will prefer the highest level he can comprehend 
to some degree rather than preferring his own level or the 
one above  it. 
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CHAPTER  V 
SUMMARY.   CONCLUSIONS,   RECOMMENDATIONS 
Kohlberg's cognitive developmental  approach   to moral 
development has revolutionized conceptualizations about what 
moral education  in  the public  schools should be.     Tradit- 
ional moral  education programs were concerned with the 
internalization of societal rules and norms and success was 
measured in  terms of virtuous behavior.    Kohlberg has put 
forth  a moral education program designed to help students 
progress through a sequence of moral stages which parallel 
movement through cognitive stage structures and social cog- 
nitive stages.     The program is based upon empirical research 
demonstrating that individuals pass through as many as six 
invariant and sequential stages that are universal struc- 
tures for viewing moral  issues.    Students engage in discuss- 
ion on moral  issues with their peers who are not all at the 
same moral stage.     Research has  shown that students progress 
most easily to a higher stage through exposure to one stage 
higher than their own.    Dissonance is created within students 
during the discussion process when they realize they cannot 
adequately solve the moral  issue based upon their own reason- 
ing,     if they are cognitively capable,  reasoning at a next 
higher stage  is then considered. 
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In order to assess moral stage transition,  to match 
students'   reasoning with a stage higher than their own 
level,   and to select appropriate dilemmas for discussions, 
educators must have a practical means of assessing moral 
stage.    At the outset of this study,  Kohlberg's  interview 
and the open-end instrument devised by Schwarz  (1974),  both 
of which require a complicated scoring procedure,  were the 
only instruments which were found to be available.    A prev- 
ious attempt to devise a multiple choice instrument with six 
choices,  one  for each stage, was unsuccessful because sub- 
jects  selected the highest  stage   statements presented regard- 
less of their own stage of moral  reasoning  (Schwarz,  1974). 
Recently Rest   (1975)  has devised a multiple choice instru- 
ment,  suitable  for high school and adult subjects which has 
a correlation coefficient of  .60 or better with Kohlberg's 
interview. 
The purpose of the study was to design a reliable objec- 
tive instrument that would correlate highly with the Kohlberg 
Moral Judgment   Interview   (1975).     Two instruments were 
devised after a   series of revisions  and pilot tests.     The 
two instruments,  one a Likert scale and the other a forced- 
choice format,  were administered along with the Kohlberg 
interview to a group of 20 seventh graders and to a group 
of 21 college undergraduate students.    A time period of one 
week was  interposed between the administration of the inter- 
view and the objective instruments. 
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As hypothesized the college sample gave the highest per- 
centage of responses at stages  3 and 4 rather than at stages 
2 and 5 on all three  instruments.     It was hypothesized that 
seventh graders would show significantly higher scores on 
stages  2  and  3 than on stages  4 and 5.     Seventh grade data 
supported the hypothesis  only for  the  interview.     Seventh 
grade scores  on the  two objective instruments were not sig- 
nificantly differentiated from the scores of the college 
sample. 
Test-retest  reliability coefficients  for the Likert 
instrument   and the   forced-choice  instrument were   .75 and  .57, 
respectively.     Correlation coefficients computed to assess 
concurrent validity were  .41  for the Likert instrument with 
the interview and  .68  for the forced-choice instrument with 
the interview.    The two instruments in their present form 
appear to yield considerably closer approximations to the 
interview when compared with previous attempts to devise an 
objective instrument.    While the present instruments are not 
valid substitutes for the interview,   it is optimistic that 
90-95% of the college subjects preferred the same stage or 
the stage higher than the subjects'  own stage of usage  (the 
comparable result  for  the  seventh grade sample was 70-75%). 
Even with this kind of result,  teachers could obtain an 
approximation of either what stage students were actually 
using or what  stage they preferred.    The preferred stage was 
usually one stage higher than their usual stage and this  is 
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the stage that teachers would want to expose to students 
in a moral discussion. 
Based upon  the encouraging results of this study the 
researcher  concludes  that  a valid and reliable objective 
instrument   is   indeed possible.     It appears  that either 
format—a Likert  scale or a  forced-choice scheme—will yield 
similar results.      It may be that  test-taking behaviors of age 
groups make one   format more suitable than  another for dif- 
ferent  age   subjects.     Much more work will be needed before 
an instrument   suitable  for   adolescents can be validated. 
Recommendations 
The  tendency  for seventh graders to prefer higher stages 
than the college   subjects  as compared to their own stage of 
usage indicated  a  possible  test-taking behavior peculiar to 
this younger age group.     Additional examination of the rela- 
tionship between preference,  comprehension,  and assimilation 
of higher stages would provide insight for those interested 
in constructing and using objective tools to assess moral 
stage.     It would be  valuable  to answer questions such as 
these:     What   is   the relationship between comprehension and 
preference for moral  statements made by others?    Does pref- 
erence for higher  stages  indicate readiness to assimilate 
higher stages?    Does the nature of stage preference change 
with increased moral maturity?    The research of Rest  (1968) 
and Rest.  Turiel.   and Kohlberg  (1969) has not provided defin- 
itive answer, to these questions.     It might also be recorded 
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that sophisticated,  nonsensical statements resembling stage 5 
statements be added to the instruments.    The addition of 
these statements might provide a measure of true comprehen- 
sion of higher  stage statements. 
Perhaps an  instrument more suited for adolescents would 
be one composed of statements  from stages 1,   2,  3,  and 4. 
The present  instruments could be altered to include stage 1 
and to omit stage 5. 
It is recommended that a revision of the objective 
instruments be attempted after the final revision of the 
Kohlberg interview.    Provided that a high correlation with 
the interview is  desired and that statements from the inter- 
view are incorporated into the test format,  the ability of 
the objective instruments to distinguish stages is only as 
good as the measurement it is based upon.    The interview and 
scoring procedure are only considered in a formative phase 
at present.     The  Kohlberg staff is well aware of the weak- 
nesses of the scoring procedure and are presently working 
to find a final,  precise version  (Kohlberg summer workshop. 
1975). 
The data from this study provide a most compelling 
argument for the need for moral education programs in the 
college environment as well as the public school milieu. 
The data from the study showed that only 6 college subjects 
out of 21 were using stage 4 reasoning to any considerable 
degree.    While thi. finding would probably not be unusually 
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different from other collage samples  it points out the need 
for increased moral stimulation.    The college population 
should be most capable of moving to some principled level 
of reasoning and certainly to stage 4 reasoning when provided 
with opportunities to engage in discussion about moral con- 
flict.    Family  life courses provide an ideal context in which 
to consider issues of human rights and contract.    Mature 
moral reasoning is essential to a more adequate understanding 
of human relationships and,  therefore,  should have some con- 
sideration in a course which deals with a variety of human 
relationships—familial,  marital,  societal,   and interpersonal 
relationships. 
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Appendix A 
i.ikert  instrument 
Age. Class  _Grade  Point Average Sex 
The following statements refer to responses people might 
give to the question:     "Why should promises be kept?"    Please 
read each statement  and circle the letter on the left indi- 
cating the degree to which the statement is characteristic 
of you or most like a response you would give.     (SC strongly 
characteristic,  C characteristic, U undecided,  N not charac- 
teristic,  SN strongly not characteristic.)    Some statements 
may contain words which you do not understand.    Draw a line 
through all the letters   (example:    00 0 U ll mi)  if you do not 
understand the statement.    There are no right or wrong 
answers.    Answer as honestly as you can. 
SC     C     U     N     SN     1. 
SC     C     U     N      SN     2. 
SC    C     U     N     SN     3. 
SC    C     U     N     SN     4. 
SC     C     U     N     SN     5. 
Friendships are built in learning to 
trust others.    Breaking promises tears 
down trust. 
Making and keeping promises allows 
people to have an informal and personal 
method of obligating themselves to under- 
take certain actions.    The conventions 
of mutual trust and fidelity are invoked 
when promises are made. 
It's important to keep promises *ith 
everyone.    There are times when we need 
friends to trust. 
If you break a promise to iflM0M«J£ 
cannot count on him any longer to keep 
promises to you. 
Everyone wants others ^Jg^jSL^ 
impression of them from the very begin 
nTna      Keeping promises helps others 
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SC C U N SN 6. 
SC C U N SN 7. 
SC C U N SN 8. 
SC C U N SN 9. 
SC C U N SN 10. 
SC C U N SN 11. 
SC C U N SN 12. 
SC C U N SN 13. 
SC C U N SN 14. 
SC C U N SN 15. 
SC C  U  N  SN  16. 
SC C U  N  SN  17. 
If you do not keep a promise, then you 
will not get to be good friends with 
that person. 
An obligation is a definite duty.  If 
a person commits himself to a promise, 
he should have the integrity and charac- 
ter to carry it out. 
The bond of trust is broken if promises 
are not kept. This causes a loss of 
faith in the promiser and often a disap- 
pointment of expectations. 
Keeping promises is one way a person 
can help build a more just world which 
is not based on force or authority. 
Keeping promises is a part of the gen- 
eral social contract between men which 
defines membership in society. 
There will not be any trust in one 
another without a person first proving 
that he can be trusted, therefore, peo- 
ple should live up to their promises. 
A person sometimes feels a friend cannot 
be trusted when a promise is not kept. 
Promises involve a special commitment 
that should not be broken. 
Promises should be kept to maintain 
self-respect and integrity. 
Keeping promises helps build a trustful 
world where everyone enjoys optimum 
freedom to live the way they want to 
while not having to worry about others 
hurting their freedom. 
If a promise is broken a person might 
not be your friend anymore. 
Promises should be kept because when 
human trust is violated that tears 
down any possible goo*^"""* can 
come out of human interaction. The 
rest core of personal interaction is 
based on trust. 
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SC C U N SN 18. 
SC C U N SN 19. 
SC C U N SN 20. 
SC C U N SN 21. 
SC C U N SN 22. 
SC C U N SN 23. 
SC    C     U     N     SN     24. 
When a person keeps a promise,  it 
establishes a good impression about 
that person and a mutual trust. 
A promise should be kept to avoid the 
disappointment of the person who will 
not get what was promised. 
Social relationships depend on people 
keeping their word to prevent conflict 
and to maintain order. 
Promises have a sacred character;  they 
represent a commitment.    If the circum- 
stances of the promise don't change, 
neither should the promise. 
A promise should be kept because if 
you keep your promise you can be 
believed in.    More people will believe 
in you. 
Social actions are based to some 
extent on a sense of trust or obliga- 
tion even between strangers.     If every- 
one broke promises,  we would have no 
basis for our actions. 
Keeping promises is basic to the notion 
of trust.    Trust is basic to human rela- 
tionships,  which is essential to mean- 
ingful existence. 
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Appendix B 
Forced-Choice Instrument 
Age Class Grade Point Average, Sex 
Read the question and the sets of statements which 
follow.    Each set contains two statements,  a and b.    Circle 
the letter of the statement  (a or b) which is most charac- 
teristic of a response you would give. 
Example:     Why should a promise be kept? 
1.    (3)   Keeping promises promotes goodwill. 
b    Keeping promises encourages faith 
in people. 
There are no right or wrong answers.    Answer as honestly 
as you can. 
Why should a promise be kept? 
1. a)  The bond of trust is broken if promises are not kept. 
This causes a loss of faith in the promiser and 
often a disappointment of expectations. 
b) Keeping promises  is part of the general social con- 
tract between men which defines membership in 
society. 
2. a) The bond of trust is broken if P'omi8e».a'* *"* Sgl 
This causes a loss of faith in the promiser and often 
a disappointment of expectations. 
b) An obligation is a definite duty.    If » J?"™^. 
mits himself to a promise, he should have the mteg 
rity and character to carry it out. 
3. a)  Promises  involve a special commitment that should 
not be broken. 
b) Keeping promises  is a part of th> flUPgg^TJj 
contract between men which defines membership in 
society. 
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4. a)  Keeping promises is a part of the general social 
contract between men which defines membership in 
society. 
b) A promise should be kept to avoid the disappoint- 
ment of the person who will not get what was prom- 
ised. 
5. a)  Promises have a sacred character;  they represent a 
commitment.     If the circumstances of the promise 
don't change,  neither should the promise. 
b)   It's  important to keep promises with everyone. 
There  are times when we need friends to trust. 
6. a)  If you break a promise to someone, you cannot count 
on him any longer to keep promises to you. 
b) when a person keeps a promise,  it establishes a 
good impression about that person and a mutual 
trust. 
7. a) Keeping promises helps build a trustful world where 
everyone enjoys optimum freedom to live the way they 
want to while not having to worry about others hurt- 
ing their freedom. 
b) Everyone wants others to have a good impression of 
them from the very beginning.    Keeping promises 
helps others build a better image of a person and 
gives  them a clue to a person's character. 
8. a)  Promises should be kept because when human trust is 
violated that tears down any possible goodness tnat 
can come out of human interaction.    The real core 
of personal  interaction is based on trust. 
b) There will not be any trust in one ^°"Le* Wjth?we_ a person first proving that he can be trusted,  there 
fore,   people should live up to their promises. 
9. a)  Keeping promises helps build a trustful world where 
everyone enjoys optimum freedom to live *****.JJJ* 
want to while not having to worry about others hurt 
ing their freedom. 
b)  An obligation  is a definite duty,    ff a person com-_ 
mits himself to a promise,  he should have the integ 
rity and character to carry it out. 
10 4 
10.    a)   Keeping promises   is  one way a person can help 
build a more  just world which is not based on 
b) 
11.    a) 
12. a) 
b) 
13. a) 
b) 
14. a) 
b) 
15. a) 
b) 
16. a) 
b) 
force or authority. 
If you break a promise to someone, you cannot 
count on him any longer to keep promises to you. 
Promises have a sacred character; they represent 
a commitment. If the circumstances of the prom- 
ise don't change,  neither should the promise. 
Keeping promises is the way a person can help 
build a more just world which is not based on 
force or authority. 
Friendships  are built  in learning to trust others. 
Breaking promises tears down trust. 
Social relationships depend on people keeping 
their word to prevent conflict and to maintain 
order. 
A person sometimes feels a friend cannot be trusted 
when a promise  is not kept. 
A promise should be kept because if you keep your 
promise you can be believed in. More people will 
believe  in you. 
If you do not keep a promise,  then you will not 
get to be good  friends with that person. 
Promises involve a special commitment that should 
not be broken. 
Friendships  are built   in learning to trust others. 
Breaking promises  tears down trust. 
If you do not keep a promise,  then you will not 
get to be good friends with that person. 
Promises should be kept to maintain self-respect 
and integrity. 
If you break a promise   to someone.   y«limm* count 
on him any longer to keep promises to you. 
105 
17,    a)  There will not be  any trust in one another without 
a person  first proving that he can be trusted, 
therefore,   people should live up to their promises. 
b)  Social  actions are based to some extent on a 
sense of  trust or obligation even between stran- 
gers.     If  everyone broke promises we would have 
no basis  for our actions. 
18.    a)  Keeping promises  is basic to the notion of trust. 
Trust   is  basic to human relationships,  which is 
essential to meaningful existence. 
b)  It's important to keep promises with everyone. 
There are  times when we need friends to trust. 
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Appendix C 
The  Research Instruments 
Kohlberg Moral  Judgment   Interview   (Taken from Kohlberg,   1975) 
Form A 
Story I.     In  Europe,   a woman was  near death from a special 
kind of cancer.     There was one drug that the doc- 
tors thought might save her.     It was a form of rad- 
ium that  a  druggist   in the same town had recently 
discovered.     The drug was expensive to make,   but 
the druggist was charging ten times what the drug 
cost him to make.     He paid $200 for the radium 
and charged  $2,000   for a  small dose of the drug. 
The  sick woman's husband,   Heinz,   went to everyone 
he knew to  borrow the money,   but he could only 
get  together about $1,000 which is half of what it 
cost.     He told the druggist that his wife was dying, 
and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay 
later.     But  the druggist  said.   "No,   I discovered 
the drug and I'm going to make money from it." 
So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's 
store to steal the drug for his wife. 
1. Should Heinz steal the drug?    Why? 
2. Which  is worse,   letting  someone die or stealing?    Why? 
2a. what does  the value of life mean to you.  anyway? 
3. Is there a good reason for  a husband to steal if he 
doesn't  love  his wife? 
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4. Would it be as right to steal it for a stranger as 
his wife?    Why? 
5. suppose he was  stealing it for a pet he loved dearly. 
Would it be right to steal for the pet?   Why? 
6. Heinz steals the drug and is caught.    Should the judge 
sentence him or should he let him go free? Why? 
7. The judge thinks of letting him go free.    What would 
be his reasons  for doing so? 
8. Thinking in terms of society,  what would be the best 
reasons  for the  judge to give him some sentence? 
9. Thinking in terms of society,  what would be the best 
reasons for the  judge to not give him some sentence? 
Story II.     Joe is a fourteen-year-old boy who wanted to go 
to camp very much.    His father promised him he 
could go if he saved up the money for it himself. 
So Joe worked hard at his paper route and saved 
up the $40 it cost to go to camp and a little more 
besides.     But  just before camp was going to start, 
his father changed his mind.    Some of his friends 
decided to go on a special fishing trip,  and Joe's 
father was short of the money it would cost.    So 
he told Joe to give him the money he had saved 
from th. paper route.    Joe didn't want to give up 
going to camp,  so he thought of refusing to give 
his father the money. 
. 
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1. Should Joe refuse  to give his father the money?    Why? 
2. Is there any way in which the father has a right to tell 
the son to give him the money?    Why? 
3. What is the most important thing a good father should 
recognize  in his relation to his son?    Why that? 
4. What is the most important thing a good son should 
recognize in his relation to his father?    Why that? 
Story III.     Two young men,  brothers,  had gotten into serious 
trouble.    They were secretly leaving town in a 
hurry and needed money.    Karl,  the older one, 
broke into a store and stole $500.    Bob.  the 
younger one.  went to a retired old man who was 
known to help people in town.    Bob told the man 
that he was very aick and he needed $500 to pay 
for the operation.    Really he wasn't sick at all 
and he had no intention of paying the man back. 
Although the man didn't know Bob very well, he 
loaned him the money.    So Bob and Karl skipped 
town,  each with $500. 
1. Which would be wor...  stealing like ttrl or cheating 
like Bob?    Why? 
2. suppose Bob had gotten the loan from a bank with no 
intention of paying  it back.    X. borrowing from the ban* 
or the old man worae?    Why? 
3. mm 4. you M i. th. «r.t thin, — <*-"■• •» 
old man? 
, 
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4. Why shouldn't someone steal from a store? 
5. What is the value or importance of property rights? 
6. Which would be worse in terms of society's welfare, 
cheating like Bob or stealing like Karl? Why? 
7. Would your conscience feel worse if you cheated like Bob 
or stole like Karl? Why? 
8. What do people mean by conscience? What do you think 
of as your conscience and what does it do? 
8a. What or who tells you what is right or wrong? 
9. is there anything about your sense of conscience which 
is special or different from that of most people? What? 
10. How do people get their consciences?  (How did you get 
or develop a conscience?) 
